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The Billionaire’s Treasure Trove: A Call
to Reform Private Art Museums and the
Private Benefit Doctrine
E. Alex Kirk*
Thanks to the new generation of billionaire art collectors, and the recent boom in the art market, a growing number of high-net-worth patrons are creating their own tax-exempt private art museums. These
“jewel-box” museums provide invaluable public benefits, lead to growth
and innovation in the private museum sector, and encourage donors to
pursue more avant-gardes collecting strategies. This advantageous taxsaving strategy appeals to wealthy individuals, who wish to maintain
control over their art collection, and still receive generous charitable income tax deductions. However, several private museums have recently
come under fire due to private benefit concerns. To qualify for federal tax
exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, a private museum must serve public rather than private interests. Ambiguity
in the regulatory scheme has allowed some high-net-worth individuals to
exploit loopholes in the tax law, which is silent on how these private museums should comply with the public benefit requirement, and the types
of activities that constitute substantial, and therefore, impermissible private benefits. The tax law is structured to incentivize charitable giving:
Taxpayers can write off the cost of maintaining their art collections, subsidize the cost of newly purchased artworks, and leave behind a lasting
philanthropic legacy. It is practically impossible for private museums to
not provide some sort of private benefit.
*
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This Note proposes to reform the limitations on private benefit with
flexible guidelines that allow for involvement during the donor’s lifetime, provide these organizations with enough autonomy to carry out
their unique charitable vision, and encourage charitable giving. Private
benefit should continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in consideration of the organization’s available resources, size, and funding. Any
updates in the regulatory scheme should not foreclose on these charitable
deductions altogether, and should be narrowly tailored to prevent only
those activities with substantial enough private benefits to justify the revocation of their tax-exempt status. Private museums that encourage
public engagement with the arts and provide meaningful public benefits
should still be entitled to tax exemption, and benefit from insubstantial
nonexempt activities that effectuate their overall charitable purposes.
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INTRODUCTION
“Museums are very much a part of the community,
but that role is not well understood and [has not]
been well publicized.” – Ford Bell1
Due to the efforts of many forward-thinking wealthy individuals, the private museum sector has helped to transform the cultural
landscape in the United States. This modern-day private museum
“Renaissance” has signaled a major shift in the nonprofit art sector.2 Over ninety percent of artworks in American museums were
donated by private collections, and some of the country’s most
prized art museums started in private institutions.3 Part of the recent boom in the private museum sector is attributable to the “skyrocketing value of art and the growing number of collectors who
buy it as an investment . . . .”4 Thanks to the new generation of
high-net-worth art collectors, a growing number of patrons are
creating their own private exhibition spaces. Rather than donate to
more established public museums, taxpayers can create their own
private tax-exempt museums, which receive generous federal charitable tax deductions, and allow wealthy individuals to “write off”
their private art collections.5 Charitable deductions save art collectors millions of dollars by donating their art and assets to private
operating foundations—“founders can deduct the full market value of any art, cash and stocks they donate, even when the museums
are just a quick stroll from their living rooms.”6
Along with the prestige and power that accompanies the creation of one’s own private museum, donor-founders’ are charged
1

A History of Museums, ‘The Memory of Mankind,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 24, 2008,
1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=97377145
[https://perma.cc/TY37-WSSQ].
2
Cat Weaver, When Private Art Collectors Go Public. Part 1: Ego, Branding, Power and
Taxes, GALLERYINTELL (2013), http://www.galleryintell.com/when-private-collectors-gopublic-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/3SY9-88J7].
3
Patricia Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door: Art Collectors Gain Tax Benefits
from Private Museums, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/
11/business/art-collectors-gain-tax-benefits-from-private-museums.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/PZ2D-CFSG] [hereinafter Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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with the social responsibility of providing meaningful public benefits.7 Any artworks placed in a tax-exempt museum become cultural
relics that belong in the public domain. The Internal Revenue Code
(the “Code”) imposes minimal requirements to qualify for federal
tax-exemption under section 501(c)(3), and only mandates that private museums conduct charitable activities in furtherance of public, rather private interests.8 Museums are “steward[s] of the public trust,” and must appropriately dedicate their resources to serve
the public good.9 These private “jewel-box museums”10 are compelling in the long run: They provide unique public benefits that
their public counterparts cannot, encourage public engagement
with the arts, and safeguard some of the most influential fine art
collections for generations to come. But as the nonprofit sector
continues to grow, so does the potential for abuse by nonprofit arts
organizations that benefit from federal tax exemptions.11 The Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) has failed to clearly outline
what constitutes a substantial enough private benefit to outweigh
the public benefit, and justify the revocation of an organization’s
tax-exempt status.12 Consequently, the private museum sector is
left with little guidance on how to best carry out its charitable purposes.
Out of growing concern over whether these private operating
foundations satisfy the public benefit requirement, Senator Orrin
G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee (the
“Committee”), recently conducted a review of eleven private taxexempt museums that focused on “the nature of the relationship

7

See Weaver, supra note 2.
For background information on section 501(c)(3) and the public benefit requirement,
see generally infra Section I.A.
9
Code of Ethics for Museums, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS (2000), http://www.aamus.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/
P78Y-HMN5].
10
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
11
Id.
12
See generally Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., to
John Koskinen, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (May 17, 2016), http://www.finance.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20IRS%20on%20Private%20Museums.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FXD8-DYKD].
8
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between the donor and museum,”13 summarizing his findings in a
letter to IRS Commissioner John Koskinen.14 Senator Hatch
launched the congressional inquiry (the “Inquiry”) in November
2015 to investigate “bedrock institutions . . . that have long enjoyed
preferential tax treatment.”15 Several factors were taken into account: The three most glaring issues were the amount of donor
control over the foundation’s governance and assets, the degree of
access provided to the general public, and the type of private benefits, if any, these organizations impart on their founders.16 The
Code appears to be fundamentally unfair if it is rigged in favor of
wealthy art patrons who can create their own private exhibition
spaces under the guise of a tax-exempt organization. Collectors
may still be entitled to charitable tax deductions even if the organization affords the donor-founder significant private benefits, and is
only open to the public on a limited basis, if at all. The investigation
highlights the need to reevaluate whether these type of private museums should qualify for federal tax exemption, and if so, whether
their tax-exempt status should be subject to certain limitations to
ensure that these institutions’ activities are in furtherance of their
charitable purposes.17 Unfortunately, the Committee failed to provide any explanation as to what standards should be in place, and
how to resolve the ambiguities within the Code.18 The Inquiry sug13

Among those surveyed were: Brant Foundation Art Study Center in Greenwich,
Connecticut; The Broad in Los Angeles, California; El Segundo Museum of Art in El
Segundo, California; Fisher Landau Center for Art in Queens, New York; Glenstone in
Potomac, Maryland; Goss-Michael Foundation in Dallas, Texas; Hall Art Foundation in
Reading, Vermont; Kreeger Museum in Washington, D.C.; Linda Pace Foundation in
San Antonio, Texas; Pier 24 in San Francisco, California; and Rubell Family Collection in
Miami, Florida. See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
14
Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Hatch Concludes Review into TaxExempt Private Museums, Notes Concerning Findings (June 2, 2016), http://www.
finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-concludes-review-into-tax-exempt-privatemuseums-notes-concerning-findings [https://perma.cc/KY8C-234P].
15
Patricia Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/business/tax-status-of-museumsquestioned-by-senators.html [https://perma.cc/J5U3-BR4H] [hereinafter Cohen, Tax
Status of Museums Questioned by Senators].
16
Id.
17
See Press Release, supra note 14.
18
May Harris & Linda Rosenthal, Senate Review of Private Museums Ends with a
Whimper, FOR PURPOSE L. GROUP (July 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.forpurposelaw.
com/senate-review-private-museums-ends/ [https://perma.cc/A4UP-AP4Y] (observing
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gests that some private museums may need to publicize how their
charitable activities justify their tax-exempt status, or expand their
facilities and programmatic efforts to better achieve their charitable
purposes.19
To better understand the tax treatment of private museums and
collectors in the United States, this Note explores the public benefit requirement under section 501(c)(3) of the Code, and the private benefit doctrine. Part I of this Note recounts the requirements
for federal tax exemption, the historical landscape of charitable giving in the arts, and recent developments in the Code, which depart
from the traditional model of donating to public art museums in
favor of encouraging wealthy art patrons to create their own private
art museums. Part II examines the importance of charitable deductions, and the regulatory scheme governing private operating foundations. Part III presents an overview of the private benefit doctrine that provides the necessary context for this Note. This Part
describes the operational and organizational tests used to determine whether a private museum satisfies the public benefit requirement, and the quantitative and qualitative tests utilized to assess whether any private benefits conferred are substantial enough
to warrant the revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status.
Part IV devotes considerable discussion to the regulatory challenges that result from the current body of law, and addresses the
possibilities for updating the regulatory scheme. Given the complexity of the private benefit inquiry, this Note recommends that
the IRS adopt flexible regulations and/or guidelines to help curb
donor abuse, and evaluate private benefit on a case-by-case basis.
Reform should aim to deter only those organizations that abuse the
Code in furtherance of non-charitable purposes, rather than do
away with the charitable deductions altogether. Though we want to
control the dangers that excessive private benefits pose, there is
concern that too stringent rules will destroy the majority of the tax
benefits that incentivize donor participation in the private museum
sector. Finally, Part V provides examples of how these private op-

that the Committee’s “results are inconclusive; there are no clear commonalities or
trends”).
19
See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
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erating foundations should avoid private benefits that may jeopardize their tax-exempt status.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ART MUSEUMS
“At its core, a museum is an educational organization. Its primary purpose is to collect objects
deemed worthy of preservation and to instruct the
public through the presentation of exhibits and other activities generated by critical collecting.”20
A museum is defined as “a public or private nonprofit institution . . . organized on a permanent basis for essentially educational
and aesthetic purposes and which, using a professional staff . . . ”
owns or acquires, cares for, and exhibits works of art on a regular
schedule.21 There are as many as 17,000 museums in the United
States, which draw crowds of more than 800 million people annually.22 Generally, a museum’s primary mission is to display objects
and artworks from its collection, and provide access to the public
for educational and scholarly purposes.23 The act of accessioning
an artwork bestows a particular set of values.24 Museums play a vital role in curating their own canons of art history, and must act as
“moral institutions.”25 Section I.A sets forth the requirements for
private art museums to qualify for federal tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code, and Section I.B illustrates the rationale
for wealthy art collectors to create their own private foundations,
rather than donate to more established public organizations.

20

2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS,
INVESTORS, DEALERS, & ARTISTS 1341 (4th ed. 2012).
21
2 C.F.R. § 3187.3(a)(1)–(3) (2017).
22
Leila John, Comment, Museums and the Tax Collector: The Tax Treatment of Museums
at the Federal, State, and Local Level, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 877, 883 (2013).
23
Roberta Frey Gilboe, Museum Acquisitions 101: A Primer for Collectors, 1 ART &
MUSEUM L.J. 105, 107 (2006).
24
LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 20, at 1477; see also supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
25
Sue Hubbard, Personality of the Year, APOLLO, Dec. 1, 2010, at 26, 29 (quoting Sam
Keller, Director of Fondation Beyeler).
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A. Requirements for Section 501(c)(3) Federal Tax Exemption
The IRS’s charitable deduction-related regulation is the broadest method of oversight for the private museum sector, as there is
little regulation of the art world.26 Section 501(c)(3) of the Code
provides income tax exemption for organizations that qualify as
“[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for . . . educational purposes . . . .”27 Art museums qualify as an educational tax-exempt entity.28 Museums are civic centers: Art collections are held in a
“[c]ustodial trust”29 that confers an intrinsic duty to satisfy the
public benefit requirement.30 Ownership of a private tax-exempt
exhibition space imposes an obligation for the founder to provide
meaningful community and cultural engagement beyond mere connoisseurship.31 These tax-exempt organizations provide unique
26

See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Educational organizations are required to provide either:
“(a) [t]he instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or
developing his capabilities; or (b) the instruction of the public on subjects useful to the
individual and beneficial to the community.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (2017).
28
Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337, 343 (1980). Educational
organizations include: “[m]useums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras, and other
similar organizations.” § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), Ex. (4).
29
Herrington J. Bryce, The Public’s Trust in Nonprofit Organizations: The Role of
Relationship Marketing and Management, 49 CAL. MGMT. REV. 112, 122 (2007) (This trust
is “recognized in nonprofit law, governance, and financial management, because all
nonprofits are composed of, hold, and operate social assets for the benefit of a group or
society.”).
30
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC
1, 14 (2001), https://www.si.edu/Content/opanda/docs/Rpts2001/01.10.ArtPublic.
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MZT-377F]. Museum programming should ensure:
[P]rograms support its mission and public trust responsibilities[;] . . .
programs are accessible and encourage participation of the widest
possible audience consistent with its mission and resources[;]
programs respect pluralistic values, traditions and concerns[;]
revenue-producing activities and activities that involve relationships
with external entities are compatible with the museum’s mission and
support its public trust responsibilities[; and] programs promote the
public good rather than individual financial gain.
Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9.
31
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 5 (citing
STEPHEN E. WEIL, The Proper Business of the Museum: Ideas or Thing?, in RETHINKING THE
MUSEUM AND OTHER MEDITATIONS 43, 50 (1990)). See generally infra Section III.B.1
(explaining that a private museum’s true purposes must be in furtherance of the public
benefit). A private museum should actively conduct activities that are directly related to its
27
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public benefits through exhibitions, educational programming,
community outreach, and tourism revenue.32 Museums not only
have a tremendous impact on “the representation of a community
and its highest values and truths,” but also help “define the relative standing of individuals within that community.”33 Consequently, those in control of museums determine “[w]hat we see
and do not see in art museums—and on what terms and by whose
authority we do or do not see it.”34 The level of influence these
founders have over the “cultural experience[s]” in their communities is inexorably linked to the public benefit of these institutions,
and this complex relationship is primarily the reason why these private museums have become the subject of such fierce scrutiny.35
B. Billionaire “Super Collectors” and the Proliferation of the Private
Museum
The burgeoning private art museum sector in the United States
is not a new trend.36 Since the nineteenth century, notable art patrons and philanthropists in the United States have devoted invaluable resources to form their own private museums.37 As the audience for museums matured throughout the nineteenth century,
the public grew to appreciate the cultural value and immense transformative power of these public exhibition spaces.38 During the
twentieth century, the general consensus among the art world cognoscenti shifted away from this ideal toward the modern view of
the “aesthetic” museum,39 as more private collectors “were simply being more true to their own calling than to existing institudeclared tax-exempt educational purposes. Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-2(a)(2)(i) (2017)
(emphasis added); cf. § 53.4942(b)-2(a)(6), Ex. (2).
32
John, supra note 22, at 891.
33
Carol Duncan, The Art Museum as Ritual, in THE ART OF ART HISTORY: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY 424, 425 (Donald Preziosi ed., 2d ed. 2009).
34
Id.
35
See id.
36
See, e.g., Leonard F. Charla, Museum Acquisition Transactions: Issues for Sellers and
Donors of Art Collections, 1 ART & MUSEUM L. J. 157, 159–60 (2006).
37
ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS, PRIVATE COLLECTORS, AND THE
PUBLIC BENEFIT 1, 1 (2007), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/
PrivateCollectors3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FQ3M-JSLR]
[hereinafter
PRIVATE
COLLECTORS, AND THE PUBLIC BENEFIT].
38
See Duncan, supra note 33, at 432.
39
See id. at 430.
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tions.”40 Given the rising popularity of private museums in Europe, the opportunity for connoisseurship attracted many wealthy
individuals in the United States, who desired to amass world-class
art collections that would come to rival their more storied European counterparts.41 Several prominent museums in the United
States started off as private collections, including the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, J. Paul Getty Museum, Frick Collection,
Barnes Foundation, and Morgan Library and Museum.42 These
private museums help to define “the cultural landscape for generations” within the United States.43
Today, there are more than forty-three private art museums in
the United States, the second-highest number of private museums
in the world.44 This number has skyrocketed since 2000,45 correlating with the overall growth of philanthropic efforts within the arts
and culture charitable sector.46 In 2015, the national average for
total charitable giving in the United States rose by an average of
40

David D’Arcy, Making a Show of It: A Look at the Rising Trend that Sees Art Buyers
Creating Their Own Museums, NATIONAL (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.thenational.ae/
arts-life/art/20160813/making-a-show-of-it-a-look-at-the-rising-trend-that-sees-artbuyers-creating-their-own-museums#full [https://perma.cc/J3P8-HAN2].
41
See Charla, supra note 36.
42
See, e.g., Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15;
Michael Shnayerson, Inside the Private Museums of Billionaire Art Collectors, TOWN &
COUNTRY (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.townandcountrymag.com/leisure/arts-andculture/a9124/private-museums-of-billionaires/ [https://perma.cc/8RBT-SCA4].
43
D’Arcy, supra note 40 (“Barnes’s own wall arrangements were sacrosanct.”); see
also infra Section III.B.1 (providing background information on the history of the Barnes
Foundation).
44
Julia Halperin, US Senate Committee Submits Private Museum Findings to Internal
Revenue Service, ART NEWSPAPER (June 2, 2016), http://theartnewspaper.com/news/ussenate-committee-submits-private-museum-findings-to-internal-revenue-service/
[https://perma.cc/6NCK-YEN4] (attributing the count to the collector’s database
“Larry’s List”).
45
Jessie A. Crawford, Art for One or Art for All? Exploring the Role and Impact of
Private Collection Museums in the United States 39 (2016) (unpublished B.A. thesis,
Ohio State University) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal). “[Fifty-three percent] of the world’s private contemporary
art museums were founded between 2001 and 2010,” of which eighteen percent were
founded since 2010. Benjamin Sutton, Crunching the Numbers Behind the Boom in Private
Art Museums, HYPERALLERGIC (Jan. 21, 2016), http://hyperallergic.com/269548/
crunching-the-numbers-behind-the-boom-in-private-art-museums/ [https://perma.cc/
47UG-WQFQ].
46
Crawford, supra note 45, at 19.
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4.1% over the previous year—total giving by individuals increased
by 3.8%, totaling $264.68 billion; whereas charitable giving within
the arts and cultural sector increased by seven percent, totaling an
estimated $17.07 billion.47 The recent boom in the number of private museums can be attributed, in part, to the massive influx in
disposable income, “an insatiable public interest in art,” and a desire to benchmark one’s social and financial status (keeping up with
the Joneses).48 The eleven private art foundations that Senator
Hatch reviewed collectively have assets worth more than $1.6 billion.49 Moreover, the increase in the number of private museums
has deeply impacted the public art museum sector.50 The majority
of museums tend to rely primarily on wealthy donors, rather than
government funding.51 More established museums struggle to keep
up with the rapidly increasing art market, and are often outbid at
auction by wealthy collectors.52 Private museums tend to be richer
institutions than their public counterparts: These institutions require large endowments to guarantee their long-term survival,53
and require an immense amount of capital—especially for those
that collect contemporary art.54 Though these smaller private institutions are unlikely to entirely supplant funding of more estab47

Giving USA: 2015 Was America’s Most-Generous Year Ever, GIVING USA (June 13,
2016), https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2016/ [https://perma.cc/64S3-HMSJ]; cf.
Crawford, supra note 45, at 19 (noting that in 2014, the national average for charitable
giving in the United States rose by an average of 7.1%, whereas charitable giving within the
arts and cultural sector increased by 9.2%—the largest percentage of growth for any of the
charitable subsectors).
48
Carol Kino, Welcome to the Museum of My Stuff, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/arts/design/18kino.html
[https://perma.cc/
72C3-FUWC].
49
Halperin, supra note 44 (referring to the eleven organizations’ 2013 tax returns).
50
See Kino, supra note 48.
51
Museum Facts, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/aboutmuseums/museum-facts [https://perma.cc/4CSF-VT4T] (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).
52
See, e.g., D’Arcy, supra note 40; Increasing Number of Private Museums Stir Debate in
Art World, PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (Apr. 8, 2008), http://philanthropynewsdigest.
org/news/increasing-number-of-private-museums-stir-debate-in-art-world
[https://
perma.cc/4RWF-R2GN] [hereinafter PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG.].
53
Shnayerson, supra note 42.
54
Andrew M. Goldstein, Interview Magazine Owner Peter Brant on the New
“Renaissance” in American Art, ARTSPACE (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.artspace.com/
magazine/interviews_features/how_i_collect/how_i_collect_peter_brant-52192
[https://perma.cc/W9UL-5GL4].
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lished museums, their growth signifies a major “power shift within
the art world . . . .”55
The “paradox is that even as traditional museums depend on
these private collectors for loans and gifts, they can only show a
fraction of the art that they borrow or receive as donations.”56 The
majority of public museums only display about five percent of their
holdings at any given time, whereas the number for private museums hovers around ten percent.57 One rationale for the growth of
private museums is that donating to more established museums can
be more difficult for collectors.58 This sentiment is growing on a
global scale, as more collectors have become frustrated with the
institutional constraints of donating to public arts institutions.59
Museums tend to be “selective about what they accept,” and the
majority do not focus on collecting contemporary art, which many
consider to be a riskier practice.60 Donors are aware of the risk that
these major museums may turn around and sell any donated art in
order to stay competitive. Founding a private art exhibition space
guarantees that the donor’s collection will be on display, and “level[s] the playing field between collectors and museum professionals . . . .”61 Many collectors wish to share their remarkable collections with the public, and are able to act in furtherance of the general public interest by creating their own innovative private museums within the nonprofit sector.62

55

Kino, supra note 48.
D’Arcy, supra note 40.
57
E.g., Michael O’Hare, Capitalizing Art Museum Collections: Awkward for Museums but
Good for Art and for Society 2, 9 (Goldman Sch. Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. GSPP08005, Nov. 2005); PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG., supra note 52.
58
See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
59
Id.
60
Id.; see also Shnayerson, supra note 42.
61
Kino, supra note 48. For example, Eli Broad refused to donate a significant portion of
his contemporary art collection to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, including
works by Jeff Koons, Ed Rusha, and Cindy Sherman, after the museum would not agree
to keep most of the work on permanent exhibition. Broad instead founded his own private
museum, which is now one of Los Angeles’ foremost cultural gems. DON THOMPSON,
THE $12 MILLION STUFFED SHARK: THE CURIOUS ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPORARY ART
219 (Palgrave MacMillan 2008); Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
62
Charla, supra note 36, at 163.
56
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II. THE TAX-SAVVY CONNOISSEUR
“[I]f you were to walk up to the typical U.S. museum director and ask, ‘How are American museums funded?’ . . . [Y]ou would get a simple,
straightforward answer: ‘Precariously.’”
– Ford W. Bell63
In the United States, cultural development is furthered largely
through the tax treatment of museums: The Code is structured to
provide nonprofit organizations with a significant amount of leeway, and there is little regulation of the charitable sector.64 A museum’s level of accountability is determined by its legal status, yet
the Code has struggled to keep up with the development of private
museums.65 The current regulatory scheme reflects the view that
“[e]verything about the substance of the tax law defines charity as
fundamentally private. The tax law contemplates private creation,
private governance, and private funding of exempt organizations.”66 Despite the underlying private nature of the charitable
sector, the rules governing private collection museums mirror
those originally created to oversee “the legal status and management structure . . . [of their] public counterpart.”67 Consequently,
the systems in place to qualify for tax-exemption fail to take into
account some of the unique organizational and management structures of private art museums as discussed in the following sections.68

63

Stacy Perman, Billionaire Art Museums, BARRON’S (Nov. 29, 2014, 2:41 AM),
http://www.barrons.com/articles/billionaire-art-museums-1417230557 [https://perma.cc
/VE22-4B4S].
64
See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Rhetoric and Reality in the Tax Law of Charity, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2607, 2614 (2016).
65
Crawford, supra note 45, at 34.
66
Sugin, supra note 64.
67
See Crawford, supra note 45, at 34–35.
68
See generally id. For example, “[t]he use of an art foundation to administer a
collection affords individuals key benefits: tax deductions, tax exemptions, tax deferrals,
and continued control. Accordingly, collectors are able to continue to enjoy and manage
their collections while minimizing their overall tax liability.” Richard M. Horwood, Being
“Tax-Wise” When Managing an Art Collection, 33 J. TAX’N INV., no. 2, 2016, at 19, 28.
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A. Charitable Deduction Limitations
The Code imposes several percentage limitations on the total
amount of allowable deductions for charitable contributions made
by a donor within the taxable year, either in cash or other property,
or during a subsequent carryover year.69 Charitable deductions vary
based on the type of property donated, and the legal status of the
organization.70 Typically, an art collection is “capital gain property,” which tends to receive more favorable tax treatment.71 A donor is allowed a charitable contribution deduction for the donation
of long-term capital gain property—assets that the donor held for
more than one year, or property that appreciates in value—equal to
the property’s fair market value (“FMV”).72 This allows donors to
deduct the full value of an artwork at the time of the deduction, and
benefit from any appreciation in value.73 Section 501(c)(3) entities
are divided into private foundations and public charities.74 Generally, a donor may deduct up to fifty percent of their adjusted gross
income (“AGI”) for an enumerated group of charitable contributions, including: churches, traditional educational institutions, hospitals and medical research, governmental units, and private foundations.75 Public charities receive more favorable tax treatment
than private foundations: They are limited to thirty percent AGI
for capital gain property, and may deduct the FMV at the date of
the gift; and are limited to fifty percent AGI of the donor’s contribution base for any gifts in the form of ordinary income property or
cash.76
A private foundation “does not itself carry on any charitable activities but rather receives funds from a limited number of do69

I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) (2012).
See generally § 170.
71
§ 170(b)(1)(C)(iv).
72
See § 170(e); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(d)(3) (2017). “The fair market value is
the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts.” § 1.170A-1(c)(2).
73
See, e.g., §§ 1.170A-8(d)(3), 1.170A-4(b)(2); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR USE IN PREPARING 2016 RETURNS, pub. 526, no. 15050A, at 11 (Jan.
19, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ8F-KZ5U].
74
§ 170(b)(1).
75
§ 170(b)(1)(A).
76
See generally § 170(b)(1)(C).
70
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nors—frequently a single wealthy individual—and then invests or
distributes those funds to other 501(c)(3) organizations.”77 Private
foundations are subject to more stringent rules than public charities
due to their sources of financial support, and the ability for donors
to exert greater control over the organization.78 For example, private foundations are limited to a twenty percent deduction of AGI
for capital gain contributions made within the taxable year, with a
five-year carry-forward period.79 Still, private foundations create
three major tax incentives for donors: (1) an income tax deduction
for each taxable year during which the charitable contribution is
made; (2) avoidance of capital gains taxes based on the property
donated; and (3) a reduction, or possibly an elimination, of estate
taxes.80
B. Favorable Tax Treatment of Private Operating Foundations
Private foundations are divided into two types of organizations.
The first of the two are nonoperating foundations, which generally
provide support to charitable organizations through grants and other financial means.81 Nonoperating foundations are limited to the
twenty percent charitable deduction of the taxpayer’s basis,82 and
cannot deduct the FMV for donated artworks.83 Most private museums fall under the second category as operating foundations,
which are organizations that “directly” devote their assets or income to “the active conduct of the activities constituting” the charitable or educational purpose “for which it is organized and operated.”84 Given the differences in “organizational management,”
77

Michael Fricke, The Case Against Income Tax for Nonprofits, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1129, 1178 (2015) (citing I.R.C. § 509 (2012)).
78
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DOMESTIC PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, TAX YEAR 2013,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/2013privatefoundationsonesheet.pdf [https://perma.cc
/79LP-SGGC] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). See generally § 170(b)(1).
79
§ 170(b)(1)(D)(i)–(ii).
80
What Is a Private Foundation?, FOUND. SOURCE, https://www.foundationsource.
com/learn-about-foundations/what-is-a-private-foundation/
[https://perma.cc/G65748VK] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
81
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 78.
82
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
83
§ 170(b)(1)(D)(i).
84
I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3)(A) (2012). “Substantially all” has been interpreted to mean an
amount “equal[] [to] at least [eighty-five] percent of [the] foundation’s adjusted net
income . . . .” Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-1(c) (2017). For the purposes of section 4942(j),
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taxpayers generally choose to form a private operating foundation,
which are afforded greater tax deductions than other private grantmaking foundations, and receive generous tax treatment similar to
public charities.85
Like public charities, private operating foundations are subject
to the thirty percent and fifty percent deduction limitations.86 Any
charitable contribution of capital gain property is limited to thirty
percent AGI of the taxpayer’s contribution base for the taxable
year, and may deduct the full FMV at the date of the gift.87 A taxpayer may elect to increase the limit of the charitable contribution
base to fifty percent AGI for the taxable year, but is not entitled to
deduct the full FMV.88 If the taxpayer choses to make such an election, the amount of the deduction is limited to the taxable year in
which the contribution was made.89 Donors may carry over any deduction amount in excess for each of the following five years.90 Additionally, a donor must transfer her entire interest in the property
to the foundation, and cannot benefit from any interest that would
increase the value of the property once donated.91 Operating foundations are far more beneficial to donors than private nonoperating
foundations, who may deduct the full FMV of any property donated.92 The FMV deduction is particularly compelling for donors
who wish to gift artworks that they have owned for a long time, and
have significantly appreciated in value.93 Creating a private mu“adjusted net income” is the excess of the gross income over the total amount of the
deductions for the taxable year. § 4942(f)(1)(A)–(B).
85
Compare supra text accompanying notes 78–79, 82–83, with infra text accompanying
notes 86–93.
86
See § 170(b)(1)(C); see also notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
87
§ 170(b)(1)(C)(i), (iv).
88
§ 170(b)(1)(C)(ii)–(iii), (d)(1)(A).
89
§ 170(b)(1)(C)(iii).
90
See § 170(d)(1)(A). A donor may carry over any amount of charitable contributions
that cannot be deducted during the current taxable year because they are in excess of the
donor’s AGI limits. Id.
91
Samuel G. Wieczorek, Winokur, Lose, or Draw: Art Collectors Lose an Important Tax
Break, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 90, 94 (2008) (citing I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2006)).
92
See § 170(b)(1)(C).
93
Id. For example, a donor owns a painting with a FMV of $10,000 at the time of the
donation, but only purchased the artwork for $5,000 (the donor’s basis). If the donor gifts
the painting to a private operating foundation, then she is may deduct the full FMV. In
comparison, if the donor were to gift the painting to a private nonoperating foundation,
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seum also provides certain tax-saving advantages over donating to
more established museums. Donors do not have to report as income any appreciation of value in the donated artworks, or any
charitable contributions in the form of cash, subject to the fifty percent limitation.94 Furthermore, any assets or property donated are
not subject to estate tax if the donor wishes to bequeath these to a
private operating foundation, in the event of his or her death.95
An operating foundation must satisfy the income test, which
requires that it make “substantial” qualifying distributions for its
exempt purposes, equal to the lesser amount of either its adjusted
net income or its minimum investment return.96 Additionally, an
operating foundation must satisfy either one of the following three
alternative tests: the assets test, endowment test, or support test.97
Private museums generally meet the requirements for the assets
test, which mandates that “substantially more than half of the assets . . . are devoted directly to” its tax-exempt activities.98 To
qualify for the FMV deduction for a charitable contribution of an
artwork, an organization must use such property in a manner related to its tax-exempt purpose under section 501(c)(3), or “to or
for the use of a private foundation,” unless indicated otherwise in
the Code.99 An operating foundation must use the qualifying distribution itself, and must directly engage in activities that promote its
charitable purpose.100 Accordingly, a private museum cannot operate solely in a grant-making capacity, as this only helps other organizations achieve their charitable purposes rather than its own.101
then her charitable deduction is limited to $5,000, and she cannot benefit from any
appreciation in value. See generally § 170(b)(1).
94
See generally I.R.C. §§ 170, 4942 (2012).
95
Horwood, supra note 68, at 27.
96
§ 4942(j)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
97
See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-2 (2017). “Substantially more than half” has
been interpreted to mean at least sixty-five percent of the organization’s assets.
§ 53.4942(b)-2(a)(5).
98
§ 4942(j)(3)(B)(i).
99
§ 170(e)(1)(B)(i)–(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(i) (2017); see also INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., ART GALLERIES – AUDIT TECHNIQUE GUIDE 21 (2012), https://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-utl/artgalleries.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AWK-QXCG].
100
§ 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1).
101
See id. “[I]f a foundation does no more than select, screen, and investigate applicants
for grants or scholarships, pursuant to which the recipients perform their work or studies
alone or exclusively under the direction of some other organization, such grants or
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Certain expenditures that assist the donor’s foundation in directly
carrying out its tax-exempt purposes are considered to be qualifying distributions.102 Such qualifying distributions include the acquisition or maintenance of a museum’s operating assets (i.e., purchasing artworks), administrative expenses, and operating funds
set aside for special projects such as the acquisition, restoration, or
construction of additional facilities.103
III. THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE
“I think these types of deals do not follow the intent, even if they follow the letter, of the
law . . . . They feed into the idea that the system is
rigged toward the wealthy.” – Rebecca Wilkins104
To qualify for federal tax exemption, an organization must
show that its overall charitable purpose serves the public good, as
opposed to private interests; however, public benefit is a subjective
standard left open to interpretation.105 Section 501(c)(3) imposes
certain non-distribution constraints, and prohibits tax-exempt organizations from providing private benefits to any individuals who
are not the intended public beneficiaries.106 The Code was envisaged to prevent private foundations from “subsidizing private
transactions . . . with a charitable contribution income tax deduction to the foundation’s donor.”107 Thus, founders of tax-exempt
organizations should not engage in conduct in furtherance of their
own self-interest that conflicts with the interests of the museum’s
intended charitable class.108 Section III.A illustrates the key differscholarships will not be treated as qualifying distributions made directly for the active
conduct of the foundation’s exempt activities.” § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(2)(i).
102
§ 53.4942(b)-1(b)(1).
103
Id.
104
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
105
See Fricke, supra note 77, at 1139 (discussing “a 1939 House Committee Report
[which] states that the exemption is meant for those organizations that provide ‘benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19
(1938))).
106
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)–(2) (2017).
107
DAY PITNEY LLP, RUNNING YOUR OWN CHARITY: LEGAL BASICS OF PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS 5 (2013).
108
See § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d); see also Fricke, supra note 77, at 1139.
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ence between the private inurement and private benefit doctrines.
Section III.B and Section III.C lay out the operational and organization tests, and qualitative and quantitative tests used to assess
whether a private benefit is substantial enough to disqualify an organization’s tax-exempt status.109 Lastly, Section III.D recounts
the findings from the recent Senate Finance Committee Inquiry
into the extent that these private art museums afford their donorfounders private benefits, and illustrates the difficulty in assessing
the public benefit requirement.
A. Private Inurement and Private Benefit Constraints
Private inurement is clearly defined in the Code: An organization may only quality for tax-exemption if “no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .”110 Private inurement is characterized as a transaction
involving the “diversion of charitable assets to an insider; in effect,
it is an insider stealing from the charity.”111 These type of transactions primarily occur when an insider is overcompensated for
property given to the charitable organization or for services rendered, or the charitable organization is undercompensated for the
economic value that the insider benefits from.112 Conversely, the
rules surrounding private benefit are less palpable. These provisions are derived from the private inurement limitation, and are
“tucked away” in the Code.113 The Department of the Treasury
regulations provide a more modern approach to the prohibition
against private benefits, stating:
An organization is not . . . [qualified for exemption]
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus, . . . it is necessary for an organization to
109

See John D. Colombo, Using Donations to Set the Boundaries of Charitable Tax
Exemption, NAT’L CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & L. ANN. CONF. PROC. 1, 31 (2015)
[hereinafter Colombo, Using Donations].
110
§ 501(c)(3). “The words private shareholder or individual in section 501 refer to
persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.”
§ 1.501(a)-1(c).
111
Colombo, Using Donations, supra note 109, at 38.
112
Id.
113
John, supra note 22, at 892 (citing Micah J. Burch, National Funding for the Arts and
the Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3), 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 303, 303 (2010)).
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establish that it is not organized or operated for the
benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of
the organization, or persons controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such private interests.114
Private benefit is more of a balancing test that considers the
public and private interests at stake, and is evaluated on a case-bycase basis to determine whether the transaction involved contravenes the private benefit limitation under section 501(c)(3).115
There are two key distinctions that differentiate private benefit
from private inurement. The first is that private inurement is a
general rule that disqualifies an organization for even a single transaction that confers a private benefit, regardless of whether the organization’s overall activities are in furtherance of its charitable
purposes.116 With private benefit, a single transaction is not alone
disqualifying.117 Rather, the private benefit restriction forbids
transactions that serve more private interests than public.118
Second, private inurement focuses on “insiders” within the organization (i.e., officers or directors).119 Private benefit applies to any
“disinterested persons” outside of the intended charitable class
who receive benefits from the tax-exempt organization’s activities,
and is not only limited to insiders.120 The definition of a disqualified person extends to any family member of an insider (i.e., a
spouse, ancestor, child, grandchild, great grandchild, or the spouse
of such qualifying individual’s children, grandchildren, or great

114

§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii); see also John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58
FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2006) [hereinafter Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit].
115
See Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, supra note 114, at 1072–73.
116
Id. at 1083.
117
Id. at 1072–73.
118
Id.
119
See id. at 1073; Andrew Megosh et al., Private Benefit Under I.R.C. 501(C)(3), in
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 135, 139 (2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.
pdf [https://perma.cc/X3N3-7SUB].
120
Megosh et al., supra note 119. “Disqualified persons are ‘insiders’ - individuals and
organizations that have, or are likely to have, a close relationship with a private
foundation. Note that a corporation or other entity can be a disqualified person, despite
the ordinary meaning of the term ‘person.’” DAY PITNEY LLP, supra note 107.
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grandchildren).121 In fact, the majority of private benefit cases involve some “entities or persons that have some relationship with
the persons controlling the exempt organization.”122 To minimize
risk, private museums should generally avoid transactions that favor disqualified persons as much as possible.123
Private benefit extends beyond explicit financial transactions or
stealing, and is as a result, generally more difficult to gauge.124 The
two doctrines come into conflict with one another in the context of
private museums, where donor-founders or “insiders” often receive private benefits—either tangible or intangible.125 Certain taxsaving strategies raise the issue of the perceived fairness of the
Code, especially when wealthy donors are able to subsidize expensive art purchases.126 Private operating foundations offer donors
clear advantages over public charities, such as exclusive control
over their art collections, how the foundation’s assets are managed,
grant-making and programming decisions, and the overall governance structure.127 For example, donor-founders can deduct any
cash or stock assets contributed to a private operating foundation
to cover the ordinary and necessary expenses in connection with
the management, maintenance, or conservation of any property
held by the organization.128 These foundations “can write off the
cost of conserving, caring for and insuring the art, as well as design121

I.R.C. § 4946(d) (2012).
Megosh et al., supra note 119.
123
DAY PITNEY LLP, supra note 107; see also Colombo, Using Donations, supra note 109,
at 32 (“[I]n any particular transaction between a charity and an actor outside the
charitable class, they should ask themselves whether the transaction appears to be
structured more toward enriching the outside actors than helping the charitable class; if
the former, then alarm bells should ring loudly, although they [will not] really know if a
problem exists without litigation.”).
124
Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 138–39.
125
Id. at 144. See generally NAT’L ASSEMBLY OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, WHY SHOULD
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THE ARTS? 5–7 (2010), http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/
files/83/en/US-WhyGovSupport2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H4N-FQ5W].
126
See Steven Rodgers, Comment, Donate Your Art and Keep It Too: How the
Government Subsidizes Art Collections for the Rich and What Congress Can Do About It, 40
S. ILL. UNIV. L. J. 45, 47 (2015).
127
What Is a Private Foundation?, supra note 80 (“When assets are contributed to a
private foundation, they are excluded from the donor’s estate and, as a result, are not
subject to either federal or state estate taxes.”).
128
I.R.C. § 4942(f)(3)(A) (2012).
122
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ing and building exhibition and storage facilities.”129 Art foundations’ purchases of artworks are also exempt from “state and local
sales taxes . . . , [thereby] reducing the overall cost borne by a collector for acquiring a new object.”130 By founding private art museums, high-net-worth individuals can also avoid paying estate taxes, and simultaneously serve a charitable interest that contributes
to their philanthropic legacy.131 Public opinion, though rife with
misconceptions about museums and their finances, has gradually
shifted toward questioning why such wealthy charitable organizations merit tax exemption.132 Consequently, private museums that
do not conduct activities in furtherance of their charitable purpose—to benefit the general public—may warrant further investigation into their status as tax-exempt organizations.
B. Operational and Organizational Tests Require Private Operating
Foundations’ Tax-Exempt Activities Serve Their Intended
Beneficiaries Rather than Private Interests
In American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
defined private benefit as “nonincidental benefits conferred on disinterested persons [that] serve private interests.”133 Under section
501(c)(3), “an organization must be both organized and operated
exclusively for one or more” exempt purposes,134 and is not exempt if it fails to satisfy either test.135 To satisfy the requirements,
an organization must show “that it is not organized or operated for
the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the
creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”136
Whether an organization’s activities serve private interests is a
“factual determination” that requires the organization to show
129

Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
Horwood, supra note 68, at 27.
131
Id. at 25 (“In addition to an income tax deduction, as with noncharitable gifts, the
collector receives the benefit of removing the artwork from his or her estate for estate tax
purposes.”); see also What Is a Private Foundation?, supra note 80.
132
John, supra note 22, at 889.
133
92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989).
134
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2017).
135
Id.
136
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
130
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that it “serves public rather than private interests.”137 However,
the Code is unclear on how much public benefit is necessary to
warrant the enormous tax breaks afforded to wealthy art collectors.138 Tax-exempt organizations are inherently private, and are
afforded a fair amount of autonomy by the government.139 In reality, it is incredibly difficult to identify when a private benefit becomes substantial enough to raise concern140—essentially all charitable organizations conduct activities that confer some sort of private benefit.141
1. Organizational Test Considers a Private Museum’s
“True” Purpose
To satisfy the organizational test, “the organizational documents must limit the mission of the organization to one or more
exempt purposes; limit the organization’s power to engage in nonexempt activities[;] . . . and provide that the organization’s assets
must be distributed for other related exempt purposes upon dissolution.”142 A private operating foundation should clearly define
what audience it aims to serve, and how its resources are allocated.143 Problems arise when the museum declares a number of
charitable purposes that may be in conflict with one another.144
137

Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 135–36.
See Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15.
139
See Sugin, supra note 64 (citing EVELYN BRODY & JOHN TYLER, HOW PUBLIC IS
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY? SEPARATING REALITY FROM MYTH (1st ed. 2009)). “[T]he law
recognizes ‘the importance of philanthropic independence, respects philanthropies as
private entities, and accord[s] them the right to autonomy without undue government or
public direction and control.’” Id. (citing BRODY & TYLER, supra, at 11).
140
See id. (“[T]he tax law contains no system for evaluating how well a public interest is
served . . . .”); accord Colombo, Using Donations, supra note 109, at 30 (“No one
(including the IRS) can adequately define what it is or when it becomes a problem, for a
simple reason: literally all the activities of a charity provide private benefit in some form,
including directly to the charitable class and indirectly to a whole host of actors outside
the charitable class as a result of actually serving the charitable class.”).
141
Id.
142
John, supra note 22, at 887 (quoting Andras Kosaras, Note, Federal Income and State
Property Tax Exemption of Commercialized Nonprofits: Should Profit-Seeking Art Museums Be
Tax Exempt?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 128–29 (2000)).
143
See Megosh et al., supra note 119.
144
Cf. Mission and Institutional Planning, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS, http://www.aamus.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/mission-and-planning
[https://
138
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Under the current tax regime, whether the institution actually provides a “clear public benefit” is subject to sole discretion of the
individual in control.145 Though the actual use of the charitable gift
is within the donor’s broad discretion, the public trust is vested in
that discretion, partly because of the organization’s self-proclaimed
mission or charitable purpose.146 The Tax Court will consider the
tax-exempt “organization’s true purpose, not the stated purpose or
the organizational language.”147 Given the particularly challenging
nature of this inquiry, “[t]he best guide is the actual result or operation of an organization’s activities.”148 A private museum that
conducts educational activities will not qualify for exemption if the
true purpose “was to benefit private interests.”149 Therefore, a
private museum should only conduct activities consistent with its
goals and public purpose.
Private operating foundations pose a unique challenge in satisfying the organizational test, as they are not expressly required to
be open to the public.150 The Code only stipulates that a taxexempt organization’s mission provide a “public benefit.”151 Private operating foundations may conduct several types of taxexempt activities such as: the “exhibition of an art collection in the
foundation’s own museum,”152 lending artworks to other 501(c)(3)
organizations, grant-making or payments to individual beneficiaries
that directly relate to the organization’s exempt activities, or allow-

perma.cc/YJ2X-76GR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (“A museum’s mission statement is
the primary benchmark against which to evaluate . . . [its] performance.”).
145
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
146
Bryce, supra note 29, at 114, 119.
147
See Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 139.
148
Id. at 140.
149
See Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 140 (citing Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92
T.C. 1053 (1989)).
150
For example, a tax-exempt organization “devoted to improving the public’s
understanding of Renaissance art” meets the requirements under section 501(c)(3).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-2(a)(6), Ex. (4) (2017). Eighty percent of its assets are a
collection of Renaissance paintings that the organization lends “to museums and schools
for public display.” Id. Despite the fact that the organization “does not have a building in
which it displays these paintings,” it still satisfies the assets test if “such paintings are
devoted directly to the active conduct of activities constituting [its] exempt purpose.” Id.
151
Id.
152
Horwood, supra note 68, at 27.
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ing researchers to access the collection.153 Generally, “[e]xhibition
and access are considered an essential component of most museums’ missions and will be among the primary reasons why a museum is considering the acquisition of an object for its collections.”154 For private museums with the designated purpose of exhibiting the donor’s collection, the foundation determines how
much access to provide to the public.155 In some instances, a private
museum interprets the tax-exempt purpose to exhibit as an inherent duty to safeguard and preserve the museums’ physical assets
(such as the collection itself), rather than merely providing access
to the general public.156 For example, a private operating foundation may adopt “a traveling-collection approach, making the foundation’s artwork available to museums on loan,”157 and still qualify
as a tax-exempt organization. The underlying justification for tax
exemption is undermined if the organization uses its charitable deductions in a manner inconsistent with its overall charitable purposes.158 Consequently, a private operating foundation that exclusively lends artworks may fall short of the organizational test if its
collection is inaccessible to the general public, except when on loan
to other 501(c)(3) organizations.159
153

See generally § 53.4942(b)-1(b)(2)(i). The regulation provides an example:
[Consider] S, a [tax-]exempt organization described in section
501(c)(3), [which] maintains a large library of manuscripts and other
historical reference material relating to the history and development
of the region in which the collection is located. S makes a limited
number of annual grants to enable post-doctoral scholars and doctoral
candidates to use its library. Sometimes S obtains the right to publish
the scholar’s work, although this is not a prerequisite to the receipt of
a grant. The primary criterion for selection of grant recipients is the
usefulness of the library’s resources to the applicant’s field of study.
Under these circumstances, the grants made by S constitute
qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of S’s
exempt activities.
§ 53.4942(b)-1(d), Ex. (7) (emphasis added).
154
Gilboe, supra note 23.
155
See Horwood, supra note 68, at 28.
156
Gordon H. Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit Organizations: An Appropriate Standard
of Conduct for Trustees and Directors of Museums and Other Cultural Institutions, 85 DICK.
L. REV. 607, 610–11 (1981).
157
Horwood, supra note 68, at 27.
158
See Fricke, supra note 77, at 1161.
159
But cf. supra note 150.
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Private operating foundations perform an inimitable charitable
function that is not serviced by other tax-exempt organizations.160
These idiosyncratic institutions typically appeal to collectors of
more avant-gardes artworks—founders have a greater degree of
aesthetic control over the development of the museum’s holdings,
and as a cultural organization.161 Private museums generally abide
by the founder’s vision, except when the donor’s intent is so rigid
that it hinders the museum’s long-term growth, or undercuts the
public benefit.162 Consider the Barnes Foundation, which is one of
the earliest private foundations in the United States.163 Throughout
the early twentieth century, business tycoon Albert C. Barnes assembled one of the most remarkable collections of postImpressionist and modern paintings in the world, which is “worth
between twenty to thirty billion dollars” today.164 The Barnes
Foundation has over 2,500 masterworks by artists including Paul
Cézanne, Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Edgar Degas, Amedeo Modigliani, Vincent van Gogh, and Georges Seurat.165 Notwithstanding the
Barnes Foundation’s status as one of the world’s finest private museums, there was a time (early in his tenure of collecting) when
Barnes’ collection was predominantly unappreciated by the art
world cognoscenti, and was often mocked by prominent Philadelphia arts institutions.166 Driven largely by his passion for collecting—and to some degree his resentment of the cultural elite—
Barnes erected his own private art museum in a mansion in Lower
Merion, Pennsylvania, just outside of Philadelphia.167 Barnes
created the foundation to house his internationally renowned art

160

Kino, supra note 48.
Id.
162
Shnayerson, supra note 42.
163
Crawford, supra note 45, at 42.
164
James Panero, Outsmarting Albert Barnes, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (2011),
http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/topic/donor_intent/outsmarting_albert_
barnes [https://perma.cc/Z2LA-SZ3X]. In comparison, the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation was reported to have $33.9 billion assets in 2009. Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
161
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collection, and to develop educational programs to foster art appreciation among students.168
Barnes was a forward-thinking visionary, but placed tight restrictions on the museum that hindered the foundation’s existence
as an independent organization.169 He exerted tight control over the
museum’s operations and holdings, and meticulously curated the
display of artworks himself.170 The museum first opened its doors
in 1925 as an art school, but furnished few opportunities for the
public to visit until after Barnes’ premature death in 1951.171 Barnes
mandated that the collection stay in Lower Merion, and that the
museum’s holdings never be sold or loaned to other arts institutions.172 As a result, the Barnes Foundation was involved in a number of legal disputes that questioned whether its charitable activities provided a sufficient public benefit, in light of the limited public access to the collection.173 Ultimately, the State Attorney General required the museum to remain open to the public two days a
week, but allowed it to continue to operate by appointment only.174
In subsequent litigation during the 1990s and 2000s, the courts disregarded the donor’s original intent, and permitted the organization to increase its hours of operation and charge admission fees in
order to raise the necessary capital to maintain its operations.175
After a controversial board takeover and ensuing litigation over the
museum’s financial instability, the Barnes Foundation broke its
independence and became affiliated with various Philadelphiabased foundations.176 The museum’s holdings were eventually
transferred to the Barnes Foundation’s new home in downtown
Philadelphia, despite Barnes’ mandate that he did not want the collection to change locations or merge with a public arts organization.177
168

In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *12 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec.
13, 2004).
169
See id. at *13.
170
Id.; accord D’Arcy, supra note 40.
171
Panero, supra note 164.
172
See Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *12–13; Panero, supra note 164.
173
E.g., Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *12–13.
174
Panero, supra note 164.
175
See id.; see also Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *1.
176
See Panero, supra note 164.
177
See Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *19; see also Panero, supra note 164.
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This case demonstrates how a private museum must balance
the donor’s wishes with the organization’s tax-exempt purposes,
which may necessitate a greater amount of public access.178 The
museum’s relocation to Philadelphia enabled the Barnes Foundation to provide greater public access, and safeguard Barnes’ treasured collection for generations to come. Private museums “can
become more firmly situated in the public realm” after the donorfounder’s lifetime: Once artworks are donated to a private museum, they must remain in a tax-exempt organization.179 Ultimately, the artworks in the collection are of paramount importance to
the public benefit, not the donor’s intent.180
2. Operational Test: “Substantial” Private Benefits Threaten
Tax-Exempt Status
Additionally, an organization must be “operated exclusively”
in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes listed in section
501(c)(3).181 The operational test considers the foundation’s “behavior and whether the organization seeking section 501(c)(3) status operates in a way that meets the exempt purposes listed in the
Code.”182 The organization must administer a significant enough
public benefit to justify tax subsidies.183 The operational test broadly “prohibit[s] a substantial nonexempt purpose . . . includ[ing] inurement, private benefit, and [any] operations that further non178

See generally Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *1.
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3; see also Barnes Found., 2004
WL 2903655, at *19 (noting that there “were signals that Dr. Barnes expected the
collection to have much greater public exposure after his death”); supra text
accompanying note 142.
180
See Barnes Found., 2004 WL 2903655, at *19.
181
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2017). Note that the IRS has interpreted
“exclusively” to mean “primarily. Id.
182
John, supra note 22, at 887 (citing Kosaras, supra note 142, at 129). “Although
factors such as close control of the applicant, a proposed purchase from, financial
transaction with, or management agreement with persons in control or related parties do
not necessarily preclude exemption, they require adequate documentation and analysis to
establish that the applicant operates for public rather than private purposes.” Megosh et
al., supra note 119, at 136. A donor’s “close control . . . because of the potential for abuse,
requires a clear demonstration that private interests will not be served.” Id. (citing
Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 531 (1980), aff’d, 670
F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1980)).
183
See infra text accompanying note 235.
179
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profit goals outside the scope of section 501(c)(3).”184 Of the two
prongs, the operational test is more difficult to examine when the
private benefit is not financial or egregious.185 The IRS guidelines
vaguely address the type of situations where a nonprofit organization’s activities will threaten its tax-exempt status.186 A determination of whether or not the benefit is substantial is central to the private benefit analysis.187 Organizations that partake in activities that
create too great of a private benefit (or nonexempt activity) risk the
revocation of their tax-exempt status and penalties, although a single nonexempt activity can qualify for tax exemption if it relates to
the organization’s tax-exempt purposes.188 In these situations,
“[t]he outcome depends on the weight assigned to various indicators of exempt versus nonexempt purpose[s].”189
In addition to the public interests at stake, private museums often serve a “range of . . . special interests [that] reflect[] the scope
of” the donor-founder’s vision.190 For example, consider the Glenstone museum in Potomac, Maryland, which has raised questions
over the potential imbalance of private benefits.191 The museum’s
founders, Mitchell and Emily Rales, gained substantial tax benefits
from the foundation, where they serve as the President/Director
and President.192 The Rales donated at least $450 million in stock
184

See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 4036 (CG) (11–2005) 1, 6 (Jul. 12, 2011) (citing Better Bus.
Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945)).
185
For a discussion of the challenges in assessing private benefits that are not merely
financial transactions, see supra Section III.A.
186
Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 475, 478 (2012).
187
Id.
188
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2017). “Bad museums, moreover, harm good
museums by hoarding resources and diminishing the public’s general respect for
museums.” Catherine A. Karayan, Note, What Artworks May Come (To a Museum Near
You): The State of Fractional Charitable Giving at the Intersection of Museology and Tax
Policy, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J., 459, 474 (2011).
189
Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues in IRC 501(C)(3), in EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM (1990), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc90.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WG8T-SJFV] [hereinafter Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues].
190
Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9.
191
See generally Shnayerson, supra note 42.
192
See Form 990, No. 20-5938416, pt. VIII, Attachment 12 (2014), http://
990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_archive/205/205938416/205938416_201412_990
PF.pdf?_ga=1.224798041.2120692051.1481836656 [https://perma.cc/Q7HY-6C4Q].
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to Glenstone from 2012 to 2014, without paying capital gains tax.193
Meanwhile, the museum benefits from tax-free stock that may be
used to purchase artworks, invest in its expansion project, and/or
cover operational expenses.194 Despite the foundation’s entanglement with private interests, Glenstone provides a number of public
benefits that weigh in favor of tax exemption.195 The foundation has
made a concerted effort to serve its educational purposes by inviting children to view the contemporary art collection, which is valued at nearly one billion dollars.196 Additionally, the Rales plan to
construct a new building that will cost at least $125 million,197 and
sought further “clarification from the IRS in 2012 to determine
whether its expansion plan and land use were in accordance with
the [Code].”198 Regardless of the IRS’ decision, the Rales are unlikely to “let taxes deter them. The couple have enough money and
ambition to carry through with their plans even if the IRS were to”
revoke the foundation’s tax-exempt status.199 The lofty project
aims to attract more visitors, provide greater public access to Glenstone’s art collection, and will likely eliminate any concern over
private tax benefits.200
C. Qualitative and Quantitative Tests Fail to Define What Types of
Private Benefits Cross the Threshold from Permissible Incidental
Benefits to Impermissible Substantial Benefits
Generally, the presence of a substantial private benefit will disqualify an organization’s tax-exempt status.201 However, even substantial private benefits may be tolerated if they are considered
qualitatively and quantitatively incidental in comparison with the

193

Shnayerson, supra note 42.
Id.
195
For further examination of the Glenstone Foundation and substantial private benefit
analysis, see infra Section V.C.
196
Shnayerson, supra note 42; see also Form 990, supra note 192, at pt. II, Attachment 9.
197
Shnayerson, supra note 42.
198
See Halperin, supra note 44.
199
Shnayerson, supra note 42.
200
See id.; see also discussion infra Section V.C.
201
See Emily Chan, Private Benefit Rules – Part I: Private Benefit Doctrine, NONPROFIT L.
BLOG (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/private-benefit-rules-part-iprivate-benefit-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/MAK9-USZG].
194
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organization’s charitable goals.202 Qualitatively incidental private
benefits are “a mere byproduct of a public benefit,”203 whereas,
quantitatively private benefits should be insubstantial in amount.204
A qualitatively incidental “private benefit must not be substantial
after considering the overall public benefit conferred by the activity.”205 According to the IRS, some private benefit is qualitatively
permissible if “the benefits from the organization’s activities flow
principally to the general public . . . [and] [a]ny private benefits
derived . . . do not lessen the public benefits flowing from the organization’s operations.”206 Furthermore, the IRS ruled that “it
would be impossible for the organization to accomplish its purposes without providing” some private benefit.207
To illustrate this point, consider the Brant Foundation, which
received much scrutiny from the Senate Finance Committee Inquiry.208 Coupled with a number of concerns, including the lack of
signage and the museum’s relatively remote location, the Brant
Foundation may run into private benefit issues for recording visits
from “fellow billionaire collectors” in the organization’s 2012 tax
return as “among [its] charitable activities.”209 The Brant Foundation does in fact provide public benefits such as “organiz[ing] traveling exhibitions, sponsor[ing] lectures and host[ing] educational
202

Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues, supra note 189; see also Plumstead
Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 675 F. 2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision by the Tax Court, holding that a 501(c)(3) arts
organization’s participation in a partnership with for-profit partners would not disqualify
its tax-exempt status merely because some investors profited from the production of a
play. Id at 245. In this case, the private benefit was permissible because the investors
participation was necessary for the organization to achieve its tax-exempt purpose. See
Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324, 1330–34 (1980), aff’d, 675 F.2d
244 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit also found particularly relevant the fact that (1)
the investors were “not shareholders in or officers or directors of” the organization; and
(2) the agreement gave “full management” control over the operations to the
organization, and not the investors. Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, 675 F.2d at 245; accord Chan,
supra note 201.
203
Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137.
204
Chan, supra note 201.
205
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
206
Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137 (citing Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128).
207
Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128).
208
See infra text accompanying note 250.
209
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
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workshops for children;”210 however, “[t]he identification of the
art museum audience as an educational elite conflicts directly with
the idea that museums provide a broad public benefit.”211 These
incidental benefits are permissible so long as the organization’s taxexempt activities benefit a broad enough charitable class.212 If exhibition and access are the primary charitable purpose, then the collection should be accessible to the general public, rather than serve
a narrow class of wealthy beneficiaries.213
A private benefit is quantitatively incidental if it is “a necessary
concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, i.e.,
the activity can be accomplished only by benefiting certain private
individuals.”214 The inquiry considers the private benefit in relation “to the public benefit of the specific activity in question, not
the public benefit provided by all [of] the organization’s activities.”215 Even if the private benefit is substantial enough to question the organization’s tax-exempt status, it may be “unquantifiable . . . such as an advantage when dealing with the public.”216 The
more quantifiable the private benefit is, the greater the likelihood
that the activity is non-incidental.217 The presence of a private benefit is more likely when an organization deals primarily with a “single entity (or group of related entities), or . . . the group receiving
the benefit is small.”218
To determine whether a private benefit is either quantitatively
permissible (i.e., incidental), or crosses the threshold to be considered substantial enough to undermine the organization’s taxexempt status, consider the following two examples. A private art
museum may be organized for the educational purpose of promot210

Id.
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 7.
212
See Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, supra note 115, at 1069.
213
See Hubbard, supra note 25, at 29. Sam Keller, Director of the Fondation Beyeler,
stated: “[A]rt is universal and for everybody . . . . However, our society has done a lot to
make people insecure and not enough to educate them about it. Everyone can have an
emotional experience and gain intellectual inspiration from a great work of art.” Id. at 29–
30.
214
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
215
Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137.
216
Molk, supra note 186, at 487.
217
Megosh et al., supra note 119, at 137.
218
Id.
211
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ing the arts, and exhibiting artworks by a group of lesser-known but
accomplished local artists, yet still fall short of the operational test
if it primarily serves private interests.219 In the first scenario, a museum that provides a platform for artists to sell artwork and earn a
significant portion of the profits, cannot qualify for tax exemption,
despite its overall charitable purposes to provide support for local
artists and ensure community engagement with the visual arts.220
For example, if the artists earn ninety percent and the museum
keeps ten percent to cover its operating costs, the “principal activity . . . serves the private interests of these artists.”221 This kind of
arrangement is impermissible when the museum’s conduct provides direct private benefits that are non-incidental, and therefore,
cannot be deemed as secondary to the organization’s tax-exempt
purposes.222
In the second example, a private museum that conducts activities similar to those mentioned above may sell art and still qualify
for exemption, only if its primary activity is related to its declared
charitable purpose. In Goldsboro Art League, Inc., v. Commissioner, a
museum sold and exhibited art by local artists who earned eighty
percent of the profits, and retained twenty percent of the proceeds
to cover its operating expenses.223 The Tax Court ruled that the
museum was operated exclusively as an educational organization
under section 501(c)(3),224 in part, because its primary activity was
managing its art collection and promoting arts education to the
general public.225 This type of private benefit is lawful, so long as
the organization is not primarily dedicated to “a substantial commercial purpose.”226 The Tax Court identified several key factors
that support tax exemption, including the museum’s mission to
display “artist’s more daring works in a part of the country where
219

See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii), Ex. (2) (2017).
Id.
221
Id.
222
See id.
223
See 75 T.C. 337, 340–41 (1980).
224
Id. at 344–46.
225
Id. at 344 (determining that the organization satisfied the public benefit requirement,
in part, because “the overwhelming purpose of petitioner’s art classes, films, museum
tours, and display of its permanent collection is charitable”).
226
Id. at 342.
220
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there are no nearby art museums or galleries,” the organization’s
“dedication to teach the public, through a variety of means, to appreciate art,” and the fact that the artists who received the private
benefits were not in control.227 An activity that confers a substantial
private benefit is permissible if: (1) it is “secondary and incidental,” and (2) furthers the organization’s primary tax-exempt purposes.228
D. Hatch Review Identifies Key Areas in the Tax Code Susceptible to
Donor-Founder Abuse
The lack of clarity as to what qualifies as a non-incidental private benefit has raised concern among private collectors who must
comply with these requirements.229 For the most part, these types
of private benefits are qualitatively incidental, so long as they stem
from a greater public benefit.230 However, the rules are less clear
when assessing whether these benefits are quantitatively incidental,
or how the substantial benefits tests should be applied to private art
museums.231 Many private benefits conferred on donors and
founders of private museums are not directly quantifiable, despite
their close ties to a single entity or individual.232
The current tax regime creates an imbalance in favor of wealthy
individuals, and necessitates further review into how Congress can
best address this unfairness in the Code.233 In May 2016, the U.S.
Senate Finance Committee concluded its investigation into several
private art museums to ensure that they satisfy the public benefit
requirements under section 501(c)(3).234 The Inquiry considered
several key elements to determine whether these private operating
foundations confer substantial enough benefits to undermine the
organization’s tax-exempt charitable purposes, including: the level
of control the founder has over the museum’s assets and governance structure, the proximity of the location to the founder’s
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 345.
See supra text accompanying note 205.
See supra text accompanying notes 204–07.
See discussion supra Section III.C.
See supra text accompanying note 216.
See supra text accompanying notes 126–32.
See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
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home, and the amount of public access to the museum’s facilities.235 Senator Hatch admonished organizations that benefit their
donor-founder at the expense of their charitable purpose.236
Though none of the factors alone justify the revocation of an organization’s tax-exempt status, these may be informative when evaluating whether these private museums satisfy the qualitative and
quantitative tests.237
1. Degree of Closeness to the Donor-Founder May Indicate
Excessive Entanglement
One of the most significant factors is the source of the artworks
in the collection.238 The Code is structured to incentivize these
high-net-worth individuals to create privately funded operating
foundations,239 and grants charitable tax deductions for artworks
donated to private art museums created and controlled by the individual donor-founder.240 In practice, private operating foundations
only separate the legal ownership of a donated artwork from the
donor.241 Given the tax law’s failure to clearly establish the amount
of donor control that renders a private museum ineligible for tax
exemption, there is growing concern that some collectors will take
advantage of these legal loopholes.242 Of those surveyed, “[s]everal
museums indicated that donors who had provided more than five
percent of the collection . . . oversee [their] operations, often by
serving as” a board member or “as President of the mu-

235

E.g., Press Release, supra note 14.
Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
237
See id.
238
Id.
239
See I.R.C. § 4940(c)(3)(A) (2012).
240
Rodgers, supra note 126, at 46. “For those collectors who would like to partake in . . .
charitable giving . . . , but are reluctant to cede over control over their collections to a
wholly unrelated museum, the idea of establishing their own museum, with curators of
their choosing might be a welcome one . . . . The challenge for such an arrangement is in
determining when a donor’s control over a museum renders the museum ineligible for
tax-exempt status.” Jason Kleinman & Michelle Bergeron Spell, Tax Benefits and
Challenges of Private Museums, 20 ART & ADVOCACY, Summer 2015, at 4, http://
www.herrick.greatjakes.com/content/uploads/2016/03/Art-Advocacy-Summer-2015Volume-20-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K6Z-VLZW].
241
Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63.
242
See supra text accompanying note 236.
236
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seum . . . .”243 Additionally, there is ambiguity around donor
access, and whether access to the museum after-hours is impermissible.244 Ultimately, Senator Hatch seemed distrustful of these
type of relationships and cautioned against too much donor involvement.245
2. Congress Is Wary of Private Museums Situated Near a
Donor-Founder’s Residence
Another important factor is the location of the museum in relation to the donor’s property. The IRS has previously determined
that donors cannot deduct artworks situated in their private residence that are not primarily designated for public display.246 For
example, the IRS revoked federal tax exemption for a public exhibition space located in the backyard of taxpayer’s private residence
near the swimming pool.247 An organization’s tax-exempt status
may also be in jeopardy if the foundation is in an inconvenient location that limits public access, and is a short walk from the donor’s
private residence.248 Senator Hatch specifically raised issue with
the Brant Foundation Art Study Center in Greenwich, Connecticut, which “is just down the road from the . . . estate of its creator,
Peter M. Brant, the newsprint magnate and avid art collector.”249
There are no signs identifying the building, and the Center is located on an unmarked street, “though the location is known to the
243

Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
Id. (“Several museums indicated that their directors, trustees, and donors have
physical access to the museum outside of normal operating hours. Some of these
personnel . . . [are] donors who provided a substantial portion of the museum’s collection,
or in some cases, established the museum. These museums uniformly asserted that such
access was solely for purposes related to the museums’ operations (such as changing
exhibits, office work, etc.) and not for personal purposes.”).
245
See id.
246
See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-24-001 (Nov. 5, 1987).
247
Id. “The fact that no effort was made to advise the general public of the availability
of the garden through publicity or signs on the premises, despite the fact that most people
would be reluctant to enter private property, let alone wander around a private house and
pool, indicates an attempt to control and limit the size and timing of groups visiting the
property.” Id. (noting that visits by a few groups affiliated with a museum or school were
not enough to justify the tax exemption).
248
For discussion of the amount of access private operating foundations should provide
to satisfy the public benefit requirement, see generally supra Section III.B.
249
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
244
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art-world cognoscenti and celebrities who attend the twice-a-year
gala openings . . . .”250 There is also concern over whether the
Code should encourage donor-founders to develop art museums in
urban rather than rural communities. Many of the museums surveyed, including the Brant Foundation, were located outside of major cities, which is fairly common practice within the private museum sector.251 Art museums have played a major role in the economic diversification of their local communities, especially in
smaller cities where they play a large role in local economic development252 due to their ability to attract a large number of visitors—
both foreign and domestic—and increase local tourism.253 While
museums can have a tremendous impact on urban renewal and rural development efforts, “not all cultural institutions have fared as
well.”254 In some cases, private museums have failed to realize
their potential as “economic drivers.”255
3. Limited Public Access Warrants Further Investigation into
Whether These Private Museums Fall Short of the Public
Benefit Requirement
Additionally, the Inquiry examined the amount of access—or
lack thereof—that these private operating foundations provide to
the public.256 Private operating foundations are not expressly required to be open to the public to qualify as a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3).257 On the other hand, private museums that do not actually exhibit art themselves, and only lend
artworks, may be at odds with their tax-exempt purpose.258 In this
instance, the private benefit of favorable tax treatment to the donor
250

Id.
See id.; see also Press Release, supra note 14.
252
Beatriz Plaza et al., Culture-Led City Brands as Economic Engines: Theory and Empirics,
54 ANNALS REGIONAL SCI. 179, 181–82 (2015).
253
See id. at 190.
254
Id. at 182 n.2.
255
Id. For example, both the Milwaukee Art Museum and the Los Angeles Museum of
Contemporary Art fell short of their attendance number projections. Id.
256
Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
257
See supra Section II.B (discussing the rules governing private operating foundations).
258
Cf. discussion infra Section IV.B.1. But see supra note 150 (describing examples of
private museums that meet the public benefit requirement by lending their private
collection to other arts institutions for display).
251
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may outweigh the greater public benefit and justify the revocation
of the organization’s tax-exempt status;259 whereas a lending program that supplements the display of a private collection is likely to
support tax-exemption so long as the public benefit outweighs any
private interests at stake.260
Senator Hatch also expressed some misgivings about organizations with infrequent hours of operation.261 Senator Hatch considered limited hours of operation problematic, noting that the “total
number of hours open each week ranged from 20 to 48 hours” in a
fifty-two-week year.262 Quite a few museums have highly irregular
schedules (e.g., opening for a total of twenty-five hours per week,
closing for new projects and construction, or closing for weeks or
months at a time to install new exhibits).263 Moreover, the Committee seemed to take issue with museums that require visitors to
schedule reservations in advance.264 However, it is fairly common
practice for museums to rely on a reservation system, either exclu-

259

See supra text accompanying notes 150–58.
See generally Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12
(considering whether any of the museums created “robust loan programs that make their
art available in museums worldwide”). A number of the museums surveyed participate in
partnerships with other arts institutions to display artwork to better serve their overall
mission. Id. For example, the Hall Art Foundation provides extensive information online
regarding its loan program and images from its permanent collection. See Collection, HALL
ART FOUND., http://www.hallartfoundation.org/collection [https://perma.cc/5YWK3JSZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017); Loan Program, HALL ART FOUND.,
http://www.hallartfoundation.org/loan-program/artists/a-g [https://perma.cc/2UYH3MUL] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017); see also infra note 263 and accompanying text
(providing more information on the private foundation’s admission policies).
261
See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
262
Id. The Linda Pace Foundation in San Antonio, Texas, was found to only be open for
twenty hours per week, along with four other museums. Id.; see also Claire Voon, Tax Law
Too Lax? IRS Receives Results of Private Museum Investigation, HYPERALLERGIC (June 2,
2016), http://hyperallergic.com/303139/tax-law-too-lax-irs-receives-results-of-privatemuseum-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/8RBE-DYS2].
263
Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. Notably, the Hall Art
Foundation, a private operating foundation in Vermont, is considered “the least
welcoming for a spontaneous museum trip.” Voon, supra note 262. The Hall Foundation
is open seasonally from May to November, on weekends and Wednesdays, and only offers
appointments at 11 AM, 1 PM, and 3 PM. About, Section of Vermont, Subsection of
Locations, HALL ART FOUND., http://www.hallartfoundation.org/location/vermont
[https://perma.cc/3TFC-RZJ5] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
264
See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
260
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sively or extensively.265 Some require reservations weeks or even
months in advance due to high demand.266 One of the museums
surveyed explained, “[t]he reservation system is offered both as a
convenience to visitors and as a means of managing visitor flow to
offer an opportunity for a contemplative visit where each guest can
connect directly with the art.”267 Other considerations include the
number of visitors, the cost of admission, and alternative methods
of public access to the collection.268 The Committee looked favorably upon museums that have steadily increased their number of visitors, and condoned others for their exceptionally low attendance
records.269 Nearly all of the museums surveyed offer free admission, though Hatch acknowledged that institutional constraints
may prevent some private museums from offering free entry.270
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
“The philanthropist puts art into the public purview, teaches, refines, and improves society . . . . [P]hilanthropy [is] a [powerful] branding
tool, conferring image, taste, and social responsibility . . . . [The donor’s] ‘brand’ is defined and supplemented by adding their personal cultural assets
to the public domain . . . the collector has deemed
worth of his/her collection.”271
The results of Senator Hatch’s investigation highlight the need
to “[rein] in the out-of-control accumulation of wealth by the largest nonprofits yet keep in place all of the benefits enjoyed by those
nonprofits that use their funds diligently for the betterment of society.”272 Private museums are invaluable charitable organiza265

Id.
Id.
267
Id.
268
See id.
269
Id. “[T]he average number of visitors for the past five years was 5,700 or less, and
some of the larger institutions welcome nearly half a million visitors annually.” Id.; see
also discussion infra Section V.C; cf. discussion supra Section III.B.2.
270
See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
271
Weaver, supra note 2.
272
Fricke, supra note 77, at 1162.
266
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tions—they afford meaningful contributions in service of the public
benefit that cannot be provided by other arts institutions.273 Collectors are worried that the Senate Inquiry will have a “chilling effect” on donors considering setting up their own private museums,
or that it will lead to tighter restrictions that will prevent private art
foundations from qualifying for tax-exempt status.274 On the other
hand, those in the art world who support the Committee review
share a more altruistic view of charitable deductions: These individuals believe donors should abide by the rules, and that “the
scrutiny will simply weed out the bad apples.”275 This Part further
examines the types of private benefits provided to donor founders,
in order to determine their potential impact on the art world, and
the increased risk—if any—that these foundations and their donors
will be the subject of intense scrutiny. Section IV.A contends that
the Code should continue to incentivize participation by high-networth individuals in the private art museum sector. Section IV.B
asserts that, while there should be some level of reform, the IRS
should not set aside the current tax exemption structure altogether.
This Section demonstrates that private benefit should still be assessed on a case-by-case analysis, and proposes new guidelines to
help these private museums comply with the public benefit limitations.
A. Tax Incentives Encourage Wealthy Individuals to Participate in the
Private Museum Sector
One proposal to curb donor abuse is to limit charitable deductions to a lower percentage for private operating foundations with
the donor-founder in control.276 However, this approach may remove some of the major incentives that led wealthy art patrons to
create these museums in the first place. The current tax regime encourages billionaires to spend more money on art, and the private
273

See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
See Halperin, supra note 44.
275
Id.; see also Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3 (“Howard
Rachofsky and Vernon Faulconer, two Dallas collectors, and Rosa and Carlos de la Cruz,
who is chairman of the CC1 Companies, in Miami, have opened small museums with
limited hours and access, but neither gallery space is registered as a foundation or
charity.”).
276
Rodgers, supra note 126, at 66.
274
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museums spaces in which it is displayed, than they ordinarily
would as individual collectors.277 Alternatively, limiting deductions
may not have a significant deterrent effect—the wealthiest individuals will continue to build private collections regardless of the limitations on charitable deductions.278 The cost of establishing a private museum “is rarely offset in full by tax breaks. But those breaks
do help.”279 Despite these issues, many individuals in the art world
would keep the current tax subsidy structure for the sake of the
overall benefits to the charitable sector.280 According to Jeffrey
Deitch, the former Director of the Museum of Contemporary Art
in Los Angeles, California, “[p]rivate museums are a ‘part of our
American art culture,’ [and] . . . their recent burst of growth [is]
‘one of the most exciting developments in the international art
world.’”281
Any changes in the Code should avoid “unintended incentives,
such as when the development of fractional giving fostered what
Congress thought of as unfair tax practices.”282 Fractional charitable giving is a tax savings strategy that “allows a donor to make a
series of partial donations over an extended period of time . . . [and]
is a particularly useful tool for donors who” desire a charitable deduction, but “do not wish to completely part with the donated
277

Shnayerson, supra note 42. There has been a fundamental shift in the way that high
net-worth individuals collect: The “widespread belief that art” is one of the most stable
and valuable assets has attracted many new art patrons, who regard art as an investment
over its aesthetic value. See THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 230–32, 35; see also Susan E.
Wagner, Note, The Implications of Changing the Current Law on Charitable Deductions—
Maintaining Incentives for Donating Art to Museums, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 773, 775 (1986).
“[T]he contemporary art market has become a competitive high stakes-game, fueled by
great amounts of money and ego.” THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 228. The market is
driven by the behavior of these billionaire “supercollectors, whose fortunes originated in
finance and hedge funds.” Id. at 232.
278
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
279
Shnayerson, supra note 42.
280
See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3. Maryse Brand, Director
of the Hall Art Foundation, noted that these private museums “all have a common goal of
making artwork available for the enjoyment and education of the public,” which “far
outweigh[s] any benefits received from tax exemptions.” Id.
281
Id.
282
Sean Conley, Paint a New Picture: The Artist-Museum Partnership Act and the Opening
of New Markets for Charitable Giving, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 89, 107
(2009).
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[artwork].”283 A collector could gift only “a fraction of [the] full
interest in a work of art to a museum” and in exchange, could deduct an amount equal to the full value of the art multiplied by the
portion donated.284 Donors could dodge capital gains taxes on highly appreciated works of art.285 Collectors often held onto their artworks for decades before transferring full ownership to a museum,
and were incentivized to delay giving over a longer time period due
to the appreciation in value.286 Congress also expressed concern
over museums’ close business ties with trustees and their related
companies—a sentiment that is still expressed today among those
who have called for a closer examination of tax incentives for highincome individuals in the private museum sector.287
In response, Congress enacted the Pension Protection Act of
2006, which effectively eliminated this loophole.288 The Act imposed two affirmative requirements: (1) the donor must donate the
entire property interest within ten years from the initial fractional
contribution date, or the death of the donor, whichever is the earli283

Karayan, supra note 188, at 460 (“[Fractional charitable giving] would, for example,
allow a donor to give [ten percent] of a piece of art to a museum each year over ten
years.”). See generally supra Section II.B (discussing charitable deductions for private
operating foundations); supra Section III.A (discussing private benefits unique to these
type of tax-exempt organizations).
284
Alicia C. Beyer, Note, Gone but Not Forgotten: The End of Fractional Giving and the
Search for Alternatives, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 459, 460 (2013). In these instances, the
donor only transfers a fractional interest of the artwork, and the museum is only “entitled
to use and display the work for the amount of time corresponding to its fraction of
ownership.” Id. A contribution would be calculated “[a]t the time of the initial
donation[,]” and is equal to “the percentage interest in the work donated multiplied by
the total value of the work.” Id. at 462.
285
Wieczorek, supra note 91, at 99. Before Congress put an end to fractional giving in
2006, “some of the country’s largest and most prestigious museums relied very heavily
on fractional giving as a source of donations.” Beyer, supra note 284, at 461. “The San
Francisco Museum of Modern Art (SFMoMA), which received the most fractional
donations of any art museum, has more than eight hundred works in its permanent
collection that started as fractional gifts.” Id.; see also Rachel Emma Silverman, Joint
Custody for Your Monet, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB112060578625677881 [https://perma.cc/BN3T-ZUVX].
286
Stephanie Strom, The Man Museums Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/10/arts/design/10stro.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/VJ2Y-TFEG].
287
Id.; see also Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
288
Wieczorek, supra note 91, at 91.
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est (“the gifting period”);289 and (2) transfer substantial physical
possession of such property sometime during the gifting period, or
the organization must use the property in a manner related to its
tax-exempt purpose.290 Congress often responds to these “perverse incentives” by eliminating them altogether, “rather than
dealing directly with the offending action.”291 As a result, changes
in the Code are not always as effective of a deterrent as Congress
originally intended.292 For instance, in the absence of fractional giving, wealthy donors began to form private operating foundations,
the closest alternative that would allow donors to have some degree
of control over their art collections, while still receiving tax
breaks.293 Taxpayers that tend to skirt tax laws will alter their economic behavior in response to any alterations in the tax regime.294
To prevent the creation of similar inequities in the Code, any
changes should “be aimed at those who essentially write-off their
own collections while keeping tight control and limiting the public’s access.”295
B. Don’t Throw the Baby Out with the Bath Water!
If updated, the Code ought to reflect the public trust vested in
donors, and their organizations, to fulfill their charitable purpose.296 Tax-exempt organizations “principal responsibility . . . is
to strengthen that trust and to restore it if it is impaired by their
policies, decisions, actions, omissions, or under their supervision.”297 The aim should be to provide the nonprofit private museum sector with a certain degree of autonomy to ensure its survival.298 The current regime for tax-exemption “indicates that Con289

Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1218 (a)(3)(A)(i)(I)–(II), I.R.C. § 170(o)(3)(A)
(2012).
290
See, e.g., Pension Protection Act § 1218 (a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)–(II).
291
Conley, supra note 282, at 107.
292
See id. at 107–08.
293
See id. at 107.
294
Id.
295
Rodgers, supra note 126, at 61.
296
See Bryce, supra note 29, at 128.
297
Id. at 128–29.
298
Fricke, supra note 77, at 1166 (explaining that “an effective solution . . . must be
narrowly tailored to address the issue[,] . . . should respect the autonomy of all
organizations[,] . . . [and] must actually address the problem”).
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gress did not intend to exert much control over charitable organizations, since a deduction-based subsidy fosters the private control of
charitable organizations.”299
Reform should also ensure that any artworks placed into these
section 501(c)(3) organizations “see [their] way into the public
realm.”300 For example, the Noguchi Museum in Long Island City,
Queens, New York, was established by the “internationally renowned, Japanese-American artist Isamu Noguchi,” to house some
of his most representative artworks.301 Since its inception in 1985,
the Museum was a program of the artists’ private operating foundation, and helped “pioneer . . . the metamorphosis of the Long
Island City area into the arts district it is today.”302 After twenty
years, the Museum eventually consolidated with the Noguchi
Foundation, and received public charity status in 2005.303 With
enough time, successful private art museums, such as the Noguchi
Museum and the Barnes Foundation, eventually turn into public
charities, or develop into fully functional private arts institutions.304
Modification of the Code affects some organizations more than
others, especially tax-exempt organizations that receive support by
high-income individuals such as arts groups and educational institutions.305 These institutions rely heavily on the generosity of these
individuals, hence more stringent regulations are not in the public

299

Sugin, supra note 64, at 2615. Congress clearly distinguished private operating
foundations from public charities when it enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and
created more stringent rules for these institutions. Fricke, supra note 77, at 1138–39
(citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 496–98). Notably, there
has not been any significant action since passing the Act. Id. “For the past forty-six years,
the tax code as it pertains to nonprofits has been remarkably static.” Id.
300
Rodgers, supra note 126, at 57.
301
History, NOGUCHI MUSEUM, http://www.noguchi.org/museum/history [https://
perma.cc/G2Z6-M59U] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
305
See NAT’L ASSEMBLY OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, supra note 125, at 4.
“Undoubtedly, constituents of a group that has enjoyed a benefit for over 100 years will
be highly resistant to any change in that benefit that could be construed as a lessening of
the subsidy provided to them.” Fricke, supra note 77, at 1177.
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interest.306 Any new rules should be narrowly tailored to prevent
individuals from receiving substantial private benefits from charitable deductions.307 Reform should avoid adversely affecting organizations that provide publicly accessible educational programs and
benefits.308 It is unrealistic to expect that wealthy donors will act on
purely philanthropic motives: Collectors may partake in charitable
giving to further their own self-interests, yet still contribute meaningful public benefits.309 For one, the act of cultivating a museumquality private art collection is inextricably connected with the collector’s ego.310 It is human nature to desire recognition, and
“[v]anity can be as strong a motivation as generosity.”311 Wealthy
art collectors usually expect for their art to be viewed by their peers
and the general public.312 According to Allan Schwartzman, an art
adviser for the Rachofsky House in Dallas, Texas, “[a]rt collecting
becomes an expression of self.”313 Or as Marc Glimcher, President
of New York gallery PaceWildenstein, explained: “[It is] the
world’s most expensive MySpace.”314

306

Marsh, supra note 156, at 623; see also Mary Varson Cromer, Note, Don’t Give Me
That!: Tax Valuation of Gifts to Art Museums, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 777, 792 n.115
(2006) (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587). “Given that the
primary purpose of these provisions is to benefit charity, any benefit to the taxpayer is
[essentially] secondary and merely for the purpose of providing incentive to the taxpayer
to assist with the greater goal of benefiting charities. Id. at 793.
307
Rodgers, supra note 126, at 61.
308
Id. “In many of these instances where a small percentage of individuals are abusing
an otherwise successful system, the argument is that any new legislation would be ‘an
overreaction to a limited problem.’” Id. (citing Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable
Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056,
1079 (2003)).
309
Goldstein, supra note 54. Peter Brant, founder of the Brant Foundation, stated:
[S]omebody can come in because they are commercially interested
and think they can make a good living professionally off of art or just
make a quick dollar and everybody hates that, but I don’t hate it
because those people can turn out to be the biggest collectors in the
future, and those people can turn out to be the biggest sponsors of
museum shows in the future.
Id.
310
Kino, supra note 48.
311
D’Arcy, supra note 40.
312
Kino, supra note 48.
313
Id.
314
Id.
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Collectors assert that the public benefits outweigh any private
benefits, even in the case of the smaller museums with fewer numbers of visitors.315 The tax system must still incentivize charitable
giving, which, in some part, will always benefit collectors despite
the organization’s overall charitable purposes.316 However, the tax
law should not effectuate the private whims of these high-networth donors, if they contravene these idiosyncratic museums’
ability to transition into fully functional institutions.317 Museums
can exist in perpetuity, therefore, the Code should not foreclose on
future donors because “it all trickles down to build a much higher
form of culture.”318 In all, it is more beneficial to grant these private museums tax-exemption because of the potential loss of important donors and supporters that museums tend to rely on the
most.319
1. Any New IRS Guidelines Should Prevent Exploitation of
the Tax Regime
Rather than create an entirely separate tax regime to govern
private operating foundations, the IRS should keep the current tax
system in place, and issue new Treasury regulations or guidelines
to ensure compliance with the public benefit requirement. Tax
reform that revokes exemptions for museums undermines “the national promotion of educational programming in the humanities
and the protection of priceless collections.”320 Proposals to remove
or significantly limit charitable deductions adopt a short-sighted
view of the pedagogical role of private museums, and may thwart
their ability to become influential cultural institutions. The Code
should still incentivize private creation within the nonprofit arts
industry because it is more beneficial to allow these organizations
315

See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
See David Kocieniewski, A Family’s Billions, Artfully Sheltered, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/business/estee-lauder-heirs-tax-strategiestypify-advantages-for-wealthy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/2PF6T79V].
317
See generally supra Section III.B.1 (discussing the Barnes Foundation, and the
circumstances in which the courts may disregard the founder’s original intent to uphold
the organization’s charitable purposes above all else).
318
Goldstein, supra note 54 (quoting Peter Brant, founder of the Brant Foundation).
319
See generally Marsh, supra note 156, at 623–24.
320
John, supra note 22, at 892 (citing Burch, supra note 113, at 306).
316
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to continue to operate independently. The IRS should avoid creating over-prescriptive rules that would hinder the success of these
organizations.321 The private benefit analysis should be judged
based on the totality of the circumstances. Any new regulations
should give donors credit for investing in the private art museum
sector, and allow them to write off expenses related to the museum’s maintenance and operations, so long as these tax breaks
benefit the general public.322
Public benefit is of paramount importance: a museum’s governance, maintenance of its collection, and programmatic efforts
must all abide by the organization’s mission to serve the public and
educate society “by advancing understanding and appreciation of”
art.323 Donor-founders and those managing the museum’s operations “must do more than avoid legal liability, they must take affirmative steps to maintain their integrity” and act ethically to justify their tax-exempt status.324 Private museums must act in furtherance of their declared charitable purposes to warrant tax exemption.325 Therefore, the Code should encourage private museums to do more to ensure public engagement beyond a narrow
subset of their own community.326 At a bare minimum, private museums ought to be open to the public.327 Private arts institutions
that merely lend artworks to other 501(c)(3) organizations without
actually displaying their own collection should not qualify for taxexempt status as a private operating foundation.328 The current tax
regime allows these type of organizations to receive greater charitable deductions without contributing any tangible public benefits.329 Donors should not be entitled to more favorable tax treat321

For historical background on fractional giving, see generally supra Section IV.A.
See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
323
Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9.
324
Id.
325
Bryce, supra note 29, at 114.
326
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 6.
327
Eligibility Criteria, AM. ALLIANCE MUSEUMS (Jan. 1, 2005) http://www.aam-us.org/
resources/assessment-programs/accreditation/eligibility
[https://perma.cc/QBD243PT].
328
See generally supra Section III.B (discussing the requirements for private operating
foundations that satisfy the public benefit organizational and operational requirements for
tax-exempt status, despite the lack of public access to their art collection).
329
See supra Part III.
322
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ment for simply creating a separate entity as a conduit to lend
art.330
Due to the limited legal guidelines for private museums, standard museum best practices are informative in determining whether an organization meets the requisite public benefit requirement.331
The American Alliance of Museums (the “AAM”) revised its official definition of a museum “to insist only on the use of objects, not
on their ownership.”332 Any new regulations should adopt a similar
view as the AAM “Eligibility Criteria,” which requires its member
museums to “function[] primarily at a physical facility/site[,] . . .
be open to the public at least 1,000 hours a year[,] . . . and have at
least one paid professional staff with museum knowledge and experience.”333 In light of the various challenges in operating a private
museum—both financially and managerially334—the IRS should
avoid imposing too high of a standard on these institutions. Based
on Senator Hatch’s findings, the AAM requirements seem relatively fair when applied to both larger and smaller private art museums.335 Additionally, any physical facility used to store or display
330

See supra text accompanying notes 239–42.
See Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9.
332
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 1. The AAM
aims to “enhance[e] the ability of museums to serve the public interest . . . .” Id. at 7.
333
Eligibility Criteria, supra note 327. A museum, by definition must meet the following
requirements:
[1] be a legally organized not-for-profit institution or part of a
nonprofit organization or government entity[;] [2] be essentially
educational in nature[;] [3] have a formally stated mission[;] [4] use
and interpret objects and/or a site for the presentation of regularly
scheduled programs and exhibits[;] [5] have a formal and appropriate
program of documentation, care, and use of collections and/or
tangible objects . . . [;] [6] have at least one paid professional staff
[member] with museum knowledge and experience[;] [7] have a fulltime director to whom authority is delegated for day-to-dayoperations[; and] [7] have the financial resources sufficient to operate
effectively.
Id.
334
See supra text accompanying note 53.
335
Senator Hatch observed that the lower end of the spectrum for weekly hours of
operation is about twenty hours per week and equals slightly more than 1,000 hours total
in a fifty-two-week year. Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12. “A
number of the museums indicated that in addition to being open to the public, they also
accommodated school groups and other private visitors.” Id.; see also supra text
accompanying note 262.
331
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art must be entirely separate from the donor’s private residence,
but may be located on the same overall property if the museum is
situated in a remote area of the estate that affords an appropriate
amount of privacy.336
Any new regulations should adopt a flexible approach to donor
involvement: A reasonable amount of donor control should be
permitted during the donor-founder’s lifetime, and the donor’s
family members should be able to participate in the museum’s governance.337 Donors should be allowed to oversee these charitable
organizations, or take on a more curatorial role, so long as their involvement is in furtherance of the organization’s tax-exempt purposes.338 The tax law should tolerate some entanglement with donor-founders and their family members—and, in some instances,
insubstantial private benefits—to promote further investment in
these jewel-box private museums. Billionaire collectors often have
a remarkable eye for art, and have the means to buy some of the
best works available in the contemporary market.339
2. Case Study: The Hill Art Foundation
To illustrate these points, consider the new museum development project by billionaire art collector J. Tomilson Hill, Vice
Chairman of the Blackstone Group.340 Hill decided to open a private art museum that “will become one of the few private galleries
in New York City largely made up of a personal collection.”341 According to Hill, the museum will be primarily comprised of pieces
from his $800 million private collection, but may also borrow artworks from collections with which Hill has a relationship.342 Despite Hill’s relationship with some of the donors and institutions
that he plans to partner with, the way the foundation is structured
336

See infra notes 397–98 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.
338
See infra text accompanying notes 378–81; see also supra Section III.B.2 (discussing
the Glenstone Foundation).
339
Cf. infra text accompanying notes 380–81.
340
Robin Pogrebin, A Billionaire Is Opening a Private Art Museum in Manhattan, N.Y.
TIMES (July 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/arts/design/a-billionaireis-opening-a-private-art-museum-in-manhattan.html [https://perma.cc/SD9Z-C3A4].
341
Id.
342
See id.
337
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seems to weigh in favor of tax exemption by virtue of its tremendous public benefits. Though Hill acknowledged that the tax benefits
were a motivation, he agreed with the IRS’s concern about private
benefits, stating that “he would never open a gallery near one of his
residences, as the paper magnate Peter Brant has done . . . .”343 Hill
does not plan to name the building after himself,344 a similar sentiment among other notable collectors.345 Naming a private museum
after oneself may outwardly reflect the founder’s own significance
in creating the foundation, but it has little bearing on the actual level of donor control, or the effectiveness of the organization in accomplishing its charitable purposes.346 The foundation will make
Hill’s collection more accessible to the public—admission will be
free for visitors, and the gallery space will be open on weekdays and
Saturdays.347 In response to the growing number of public schools
that have cut funding for arts programs, the museum will make art
more accessible for children, and will provide educational arts programing for local New York City public school students.348 Hill
plans to partner with other more established institutions in New
York “like the Studio Museum in Harlem and the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, where Mr. Hill serves on the board.”349 Despite
the financial incentives and donor involvement, the Hill Foundation highlights the need for private museums to maintain their taxexempt status: These operating foundations “provide crucial educational services . . . [that] are instrumental to continuing” art education in communities for children and adults.350

343

Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 208–11.
Pogrebin, supra note 340.
345
Id. Unlike other private collectors, Mitchell and Emily Rales, prominent art
collectors and the founders of the Glenstone Foundation, intentionally chose not to name
the museum after themselves. Message from the Founders, GLENSTONE, http://
www.glenstone.org/about [https://perma.cc/RW9Y-A3UY].
346
Compare discussion supra Section III.B.2, and infra Section V.C (discussing the
Glenstone Foundation), with discussion supra Section III.C, and infra Section V.B
(discussing the Brant Foundation).
347
Pogrebin, supra note 340.
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
Crawford, supra note 45, at 37.
344
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V. FACTORS TO ASSESS PRIVATE BENEFITS
“It was not just writing a check to support bricks
and mortar or an exhibition, but a larger impact of
what this could mean to the city and all future audiences.” – Jennifer Wells Green351
The Senate Finance Committee Inquiry has drawn widespread
attention to the art world, signifying the need to reassess how these
private benefit restrictions apply to private tax-exempt art museums. The failure to clearly define what constitutes a substantial
private benefit, or provide these institutions with clear guidelines,
has allowed some wealthy individuals to take advantage of the
Code without providing meaningful public benefits.352 According to
Sheldon Cohen, former Commissioner of the IRS, “when used as
intended, the tax code’s breaks for art collectors balance private
interests with the public good.”353 The incidental benefits analysis
focuses on whether these benefits are substantial enough to jeopardize a private museum’s tax-exempt status.354 Private benefits
should continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, where certain factors weigh in favor of exemption more than others. When
considering the totality of the circumstances, it is practically impossible to create a private museum without conferring some benefit on behalf of the donor-founder.355 These organizations should be
judged by the amount of harm done to the institution, not just the
public benefit, and should only be held liable or subject to penalties
where there is evidence of significant abuse.356
The overall benefits that private museums provide are “a longterm public good” that far outweigh some of the private benefits
discussed in Section III.D, such as donor control, or in some cases,
limited access or hours of operation.357 Private benefits should only
351

Perman, supra note 63.
Rodgers, supra note 126.
353
See Kocieniewski, supra note 316.
354
See discussion supra Section III.C.
355
See Kocieniewski, supra note 316. Cohen said: “If an art collector makes significant
contributions, and the public actually gets access to the works they are donating, then the
major thing the collector gets is prestige and social status.” Id.
356
See generally Marsh, supra note 156, at 623–24.
357
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3; see also supra Part III
(applying the private benefit analysis).
352
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be disqualifying in situations where the charitable deductions are
not being used in furtherance of the organization’s tax-exempt
purposes.358 This Part illustrates various factors by which to assess
the private benefit analysis—including the size and scale of museums, degree of closeness to the donor-founder, physical location,
and amount of public access—and describes how these guidelines
should apply to private operating foundations.
A. Consider the of Size and Scale of Museums When Examining
Visitor Data
Congress should have a say in how tax dollars are spent, but to
the extent possible, it should evaluate an organization’s tax-exempt
activities relative to the private benefit.359 Unlike traditional businesses, it is more difficult for museums to implement objective performance measures to determine whether an organization satisfies
the public benefit requirement.360 Museums have cautioned against
using statistical data as objective criteria when determining the effectiveness of private museums.361 Instead, any evaluation of their
programming should be on a subjective basis.362 For example, when
examining museum data, such as visit counts, these institutions
should be compared to similarly situated institutions (i.e., museums similar in size, type, exhibition space, tourism, etc.).363 Visitor data is informative: A number of American museums are motivated to maximize their visit counts to generate income from
sources such as admissions, “sales, exhibition entrance fees,” and
these numbers often justify the need for greater financial support.364
358

See Fricke, supra note 77, at 1166.
Id.
360
For one, a more objective approach may only assess more symptomatic effects,
rather than the actual underlying phenomena, similar to the visitor count discussed in
Section III.D.3. See SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 8.
Furthermore, statistical data fails to take into many external factors (i.e., the discussion of
comparing similarly situated institutions). Id. Lastly, any assessment of visitor surveys
will conflate a more complex relationship between the museumgoer and his environment
in terms of satisfaction or visitor ratings. Id. at 15.
361
Id. at 14–15.
362
Compare discussion supra Section III.D.3., with discussion infra Section V.D.
363
See SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 9.
364
Id. at 8.
359
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In application, such considerations do not have the same effect
on richer institutions, and are inherently flawed.365 Visitor data is
not representative of the overall population—the captured demographics of museumgoers tend to be highly educated individuals, or
the “educational elite.”366 Museums’ heavy reliance on donors
(both financially and to gift artworks) has the effect of “alienat[ing] . . . the general public,” and visitors tend to be upper- and
middle-class individuals.367 As a result, the general public views
these institutions as inaccessible: “This ‘elite subordination of the
museum’ simply affirms the class status of the rich and educated”
and undermines the organization’s ability to provide meaningful
public benefits.368 Museums often use the number of visits to indicate their public impact; however, the number of visitors is not
necessarily equated with public impact.369 In some instances visitor
data may be useful in making the determination, but should not be
a determinative factor to merit the revocation of private museum’s
tax-exempt status, except in egregious cases.370

365

See id. at 8–9.
Id. at 6–7.
367
Karayan, supra note 188, at 475.
368
Id. (quoting FIONA MCLEAN, MARKETING THE MUSEUM 75 (1997)).
369
“First, the number of visits is not the same as the number of people served.”
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 8. The number of art
museumgoers has likely increased—but perhaps not substantially—“over the last few
decades probably because there are more museums,” and the numbers may include those
individuals who revisit the same museums or other affiliated institutions. Id. Second, “the
quality of programs (i.e., the satisfaction they provide users),” is distinguishable from
“the draw of such programs.” Id. Third, “a shift in priority (and presumably resources)
from collecting and research to exhibitions and community programs” may not have an
immediate effect on the number of visits. Id. Successful outreach to new audiences may
require those individuals to fundamentally change their impressions of museums. Id.
370
See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12 (finding that, in one
instance, a museum reported that as few as “456 people visited between October 2 and
November 11, 2015,” whereas another museum averaged 35,000 visitors over a period of
five years).
366
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B. Donor Involvement—Though Unorthodox—Leads to Innovative
Results and Should Be Permissible So Long as the Private Benefit Is
Not Egregious
To limit donor involvement, it is imperative that private museums diversify their “funding sources.”371 One approach to ensure that these private art museums act in the public interest, is to
forbid donors and their family members from any involvement in
the management of the foundation’s assets and governance.372 Museum founders and their family members often serve on the board
or in management positions in the foundation—an indicator for
donor control and abuse.373 Donor-controlled private museums
“will reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the founder . . . .”374
However, private museums rely heavily on individual gifts from
wealthy donors, and may not be able to survive on other methods
of financial support.375 Organizations primarily led by their founders pose a unique set of challenges, including: “feelings of ownership, board selection, inability or lack of expertise of direct management of the type of organization that they founded, feeling
stifled from a staff standpoint, questions of motivation and collaboration from outsiders, and deep public association of the organization with the founder.”376 Critics of donor involvement argue that
private museums will fare better with a more diverse management

371

Jasmine Kusumowidagdo, Adding Up the Arts: The Great Recession and the PublicPrivate Debate in the Funding of America’s Art and Art Museums 32 (Apr. 22, 2016)
(unpublished B.A. thesis, Scripps College) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
372
Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63.
373
Cf. Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 675 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1982).
Control by an individual who established the foundation is problematic where the founder
actively participates in its management, or benefits from, or has a significant voice in how
the organization is operated. E.g., id.; Plumstead Theatre Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.
1324, 1334 (1980), aff’d, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
374
Crawford, supra note 45, at 36. A museum is more likely to thrive when it is
independently governed by “art expert[s] or a diverse group of knowledgeable
individuals . . . better suited to operate a museum when compared to donors or their
families.” Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63 (citation omitted).
375
See Kusumowidagdo, supra note 371, at 26, 32; see also supra Section IV.A.1
(providing a more robust discussion of the particular set of issues that donor control
creates for private operating foundations).
376
Crawford, supra note 45, at 36.

924

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:869

structure.377 Any changes, if any, should avoid a blanket prohibition
against any connection between the donor-founder and the organization’s governance structure. Too stringent rules may discourage
organizations where the donor-founder oversees the management
of the museum, and in turn, has unfettered discretion over how the
museum provides meaningful public benefits.
Critics of the private museum phenomenon argue that wealthy
art collectors may not have a good eye for works, and in turn, are
ill-equipped to take on curatorial or managerial roles, even in the
case of their own museums.378 Conversely, in many instances involvement by donors and their family members is compatible with
the organization’s tax-exempt purpose. The donor-founder is more
likely than not to be well-versed “in the area in which he or she collects.”379 Private foundations are a reflection of the donor’s acquisition strategy and curatorial insight—private contemporary art
museums are able to take greater risks than more established museums.380 Due to the immense amount of wealth attributed to their
billionaire donor-founders, these private museums are generally
not subject to the same practical constraints as their public counterparts.381
For example, the Brant Foundation is directed by the founder’s
daughter, and the founder, Peter Brant, tends to do a lot of the curating himself.382 Similar to other wealthy art collectors, Brant is a
tastemaker, known for his dedication to collecting contemporary
art.383 Works in his collection include established artists like Andy
Warhol, who he has collected since the 1960s, and contemporary
artists, such as Jeff Koons (who he was an early collector of), Dan
Colen, Julian Schnabel, and Cady Noland.384 In November 2013,
Brant made a record-breaking sale of Jeff Koons’ Balloon Dog
377

See Rodgers, supra note 126, at 63.
See Shnayerson, supra note 42.
379
Marsh, supra note 156, at 623.
380
PRIVATE COLLECTORS, AND THE PUBLIC BENEFIT, supra note 37.
381
For discussion of donor aesthetic and financial discretion, see generally supra
Sections III.A, III.B.1.
382
See About Us, BRANT FOUND., http://brantfoundation.org/about-us/ [https://
perma.cc/QH9Z-79XX] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017); see also Goldstein, supra note 54.
383
See Goldstein, supra note 54.
384
Id.
378
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(Orange) for $58.4 million at Christie’s auction house, “the highest
price fetched by the work of a living artist at auction.”385 Brant was
motivated to sell this incredibly high-value work, in part, because
he could contribute the proceeds from the sale to the Brant Foundation’s endowment fund to help accomplish his long-term goals
for the organization.386 The ability for donor-founders and their
family members to be involved in their own operating foundations
encourages greater participation by wealthy-individuals in the private museum sector, and may lead to unexpected results that have
a tremendous impact on the cultural landscape.
Donor-founders have the ability to cultivate their creative vision to produce remarkable cultural relics. According to its mission
statement, the Judd Foundation was founded to preserve the legacy
of the widely-celebrated minimalist artist Donald Judd, and to
show and preserve his artworks.387 Judd’s two children—who serve
as the President and Vice President of the Foundation’s board—
helped the organization recover from crippling debt and open new
spaces across the country.388 The Judd Foundation campus in Marfa, Texas, is a minimalist art mecca that shows “museum-quality”
artworks and design, and has helped to transform the previously
desolate desert town into a thriving art destination.389 The Foundation is revered as a model success story of the influential role that
private museums play within the art world.390

385

Id.
Id.
387
About, JUDD FOUND., http://juddfoundation.org/foundation/about/ [https://perma.
cc/2VUE-QNXT] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
388
See generally Zoë Lescaze, Specific Objectives: The Complex Task of Preserving Donald
Judd’s Legacy, ARTNEWS (Sept. 12, 2016, 9:15 AM), http://www.artnews.com/2016/
09/12/specific-objectives-the-complex-task-of-preserving-donald-judds-legacy/ [https://
perma.cc/RN9B-NL3A]. Judd’s children inherited millions of dollars in debt after the
artist’s premature death; however, the organization has recovered and is now in good
financial standing. Id.; see also Alexandra Lange, Donald Judd’s House, NEW YORKER
(May 13, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/donald-judds-house
[https://perma.cc/YFC2-X85C] (discussing the Judd Foundation’s New York SoHo Loft
space at 101 Spring Street, which recently underwent “a three-year, twenty-three-milliondollar restoration process” before opening its doors to the public, after the building was
left in disrepair).
389
Lange, supra note 388; see also Lescaze, supra note 388.
390
See generally Lescaze, supra note 388.
386

926

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVII:869

Founder-led organizations also create more positive dynamics,
such as greater innovation, long-term investment in the organization’s growth and success, and dedication to the organization’s
overall charitable purpose.391 Hence, not all involvement by founders or their family members is detrimental to a private museum’s
charitable purposes. The tax regime should provide private operating foundations with enough leeway to cultivate their own unique
collecting strategies and institutional goals, to ensure that these
“jewel-box” museums continue to thrive and make significant contributions within the nonprofit art museum sector.
C. Though the Proximity to the Founder’s Private Residence Is an
Indicator of Abuse, Private Museums Play a Significant Role in
Improving Local Economic and Cultural Development
The IRS advises donors to never display the collection in their
residences.392 The IRS has revoked tax exemption in cases where a
taxpayer places artworks on his or her estate, and determined that,
under section 4941 of the Code, the use of a private foundation’s
income or assets by a disqualified person constitutes a substantial
private benefit.393 In Revenue Ruling 74-600, the IRS investigated
the founder of a private foundation for displaying paintings owned
by the organization in his home, which were returned to him after
being exhibited in a number of museums.394 There is likely to be a
substantial private benefit when a donor displays artwork within his
or her home, considering that this practice is outside the scope of
standard museum operations.395 As the Committee pointed out, it
391

See Perman, supra note 63. See generally discussion supra Section IV.B.
See Rev. Rul, 74-600, 1974-2 C.B 385; see also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 20, at
1300.
393
See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. The IRS took notice of “the limited
use by others,” and the fact that there were no signs to advise the public that they were
welcome to tour the property. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-24-001 (Nov. 5, 1987). While some
of the sculptures were viewable from the road, and “in theory available to the general
public, it [was] primarily only those who [were] affiliated with the art museums and
schools who receive full advantage of their availability.” Id.
394
Rev. Rul, 74-600, 1974-2 C.B 385. Even though 2,000 individuals visited the
founder’s private collection each year, including special tour groups, the IRS ruled that
the founder was “in direct use of the foundation’s assets.” Id. The IRS determined that
the placement of the panting in the founder’s residence constituted a private benefit, and
thus, disqualified the foundation’s status as a tax-exempt organization. Id.
395
See id.; see also Kleinman & Spell, supra note 240.
392
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is more ambiguous when a private museum displays its collection
near or on the founder’s property.396 In some instances, a donor
should be allowed to build a tax-exempt museum near or on her
property, so long as the building is clearly marked with signage,
publicly accessible, and does not possess any qualities of artifice
(i.e., constructed with the intent to manipulate the Code).397 However, this option is likely limited to a particular subset of “donors
with estates that are large enough to” build a structure on an entirely separate portion of their property with a suitable amount of
privacy.398 Certain practical considerations may also deter private
collectors from exhibiting their artworks within their homes.399
Many donors are opening unique exhibition spaces such as warehouses, or newly designed private art museums and exhibition
spaces, to accommodate modern artworks, which are often largescale installations or works that require special attention such as
video art.400
Consider Glenstone, which is located in an “improbable
place[] . . . separated from the Rales’ home by a large duck pond,”
and has attendance records of roughly 10,000 visitors from 2006 to
2013.401 Though this arrangement may appear suspect, the museum provides greater public benefits that warrant tax exemption.
Glenstone houses a remarkable collection of post-war and contemporary art, and has lent more than 400 artworks to other arts institutions, both domestically and internationally.402 Images of the museum’s permanent collection, exhibitions, and artworks on loan are

396

For discussion of Senator Hatch’s findings, see generally supra Section III.D.
See, e.g., Kleinman & Spell, supra note 240 (discussing Rev. Rul, 74-600, 1974-2 C.B
385). A museum should be “well publicized, [and] physically separated from the donor’s
personal living spaces.” Id.; see also Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note
3.
398
Kleinman & Spell, supra note 240. To avoid an adverse ruling, it is preferable that
the structure not be attached to the donor’s residence. See id. The location should be
permissible so long as the donor did not utilize the collection for personal use, and opens
the private exhibition space to the public. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 20, at 1300.
399
Kino, supra note 48.
400
Id.
401
Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
402
See id.; see also Form 990, supra note 192, at pt. IX, Attachment 15.
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available online.403 Furthermore, Glenstone aims to increase its
numbers to 25,000 annually, and is also undergoing a new expansion project that is expected to increase its visitors four or fivefold.404 Allowing taxpayers to found a museum on their property
incentivizes participation, and is likely more cost-effective for donors.405 Nearly sixty percent of private museums are located near
their founder’s residences.406 To rule against the ability to build
tax-exempt exhibition spaces near their homes would likely create
detrimental effects on the private museum sector.
Critics may also object to the placement of museums in rural
areas, particularly when placed near the founder’s personal residence.407 For example, In re Barnes Foundation, the Barnes Foundation was ordered to move from its original rural location to Philadelphia.408 While its new home provides greater visibility, and has
elevated the museum to an internationally renowned institution,
there is still merit in placing museums in less densely populated
rural communities.409 Nearly twenty-six percent of museums, private and public, are located in rural areas.410 Museums can have
tremendous economic effects, and help to develop both rural and
urban communities: Museums help generate tourism, create jobs,
encourage community engagement, and provide enriching cultural
experiences for visitors.411 The majority of museums’ mission
statements reflect a “community-focused spirit.”412

403

See Art, GLENSTONE, http://www.glenstone.org/art [https://perma.cc/PA5R5VKR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
404
Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15.
405
See, e.g., supra notes 128–30, 277 and accompanying text. But cf. infra notes 427–31
and accompanying text.
406
Crawford, supra note 45, at 40.
407
For historical background on the Barnes Foundation, see supra Section III.B.1.
408
See In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *1, *19 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
Dec. 13, 2004).
409
“The arts help to address some of the unique challenges faced by rural communities,
including geographic isolation, infrastructure limitations and population flight.” NAT’L
ASSEMBLY OF STATE ARTS AGENCIES, supra note 125, at 10. Private art museums “can
help to diversify rural economies by creating sustainable small businesses, improving
quality of life for residents, and attracting visitors and investment.” Id.
410
Museum Facts, supra note 51.
411
Crawford, supra note 45, at 37.
412
Id. at 40.

2017]

BILLIONAIRE’S TREASURE TROVE

929

In the context of urban development, “the focus is simply on
the presence of the museum in the community, rather than the
specific offerings found within the museum . . . .”413 For example,
the Rubell Family Collection helped transform the Miami arts district after opening in a former Drug Enforcement Administration
warehouse in 1993, and now draws tens of thousands of visitors
each year.414 Founded by Mera and Donald Rubell, the Rubell
Family Collection is one of the most notable modern art collections
in the United States, and has expanded to rival prominent arts institutions such as the Whitney Museum of American Art in New
York.415 The Rubell Family Collection created ripple effects across
the country—more prominent art collectors began to take notice of
the private art foundation phenomenon, and modeled their own
private foundations on this “Miami [Organizational] Model.”416
More private foundations followed suit and situated themselves in
this once blighted neighborhood, which has developed into Miami’s now thriving arts district.417 Iconic art museums can substantially impact economic regeneration in their communities.418 These
institutions serve as “cultural attractions” that help “stimulate
business development and allow communities to profit from the
growing market of cultural tourism.”419
D. Public Benefit Calls for Greater Public Access
To satisfy the provisions of section 501(c)(3), private museums
must provide tangible public benefits, which implies that there
should be some degree of access by the general public.420 While the
exact meaning of public benefit is unclear in the context of private
operating foundations, the general consensus is to consider the effects that a museum has on its visitors as a central tenet of museum
policy.421 The act of accessioning an artwork confers on the mu413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421

Karayan, supra note 188, at 477.
Cohen, Tax Status of Museums Questioned by Senators, supra note 15.
Kino, supra note 48.
Crawford, supra note 45, at 3.
See id.
Plaza et al., supra note 252, at 180–82.
Karayan, supra note 188, at 477.
See Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next Door, supra note 3.
SMITHSONIAN INST. OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 6.
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seum an inherent obligation to serve in the public interest with respect to the donated artwork.422 In the art world, the donation of an
artwork to a museum is in itself “considered the ultimate boon to
the public good,” whereas Congress is suspicious of “any charitable deduction that is not backed by a concrete act of giving . . . ,
even if the end result benefits ‘[a]rt.’”423 To best serve its overall
charitable purposes, a private museum’s hours of operation should
be reasonable in proportion to the foundation’s resources, and
should not be so unfriendly to deter visits from potential museumgoers.424 It is fairly common for museums to operate only a few
days a week, thus smaller private museums should not be expected
to be open more than three or four days a week.425
The same logic should be applied to museum admission fees
and reservation systems.426 For 2014 and 2015, museumgoers
“spent an average of eight dollars per visit,” and only one-third
offered free admission.427 Though the cost for a museum visit
seems relatively low, the median investment for each individual
visitor is about fifty-five dollars,428 and this high cost requires museums to earmark a portion of their operating budgets to subsidize
the cost of admission.429 Any public benefit assessment must con422

See Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 9.
Strom, supra note 286.
424
For discussion of the Hall Foundation’s admissions policies, see supra note 263. The
Hall Foundation had about 1,500 visitors from 2013 to 2014, and operates three days a
week for a period lasting only six months per year. Cohen, Writing Off the Warhol Next
Door, supra note 3.
425
Cf. Location, Hours, and Admission, MUSEUM MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/
visit/index [https://perma.cc/2RCF-G3LZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). MoMA PS1, an
affiliate of the Museum of Modern Art in Manhattan, is closed on Tuesdays and
Wednesdays. Id.
426
For a discussion of various museum’s admission policies, see supra Section III.D.3.
427
ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS BY THE NUMBERS 2015 1, 6 (2016),
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/Art%20Museums%20By%20The%20Nu
mbers%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX75-MEPU] (noting that “the average amount
visitors spent per museum visit . . . include[s] the cost of admission and any ancillary
purchases (internal punctuation omitted)); cf. John, supra note 22. The average cost of
admission has steadily increased since 2012, when “[t]he average price for admission
[was] about seven dollars, and . . . [t]he median cost to museums per visitor [was] about
$31.40.” John, supra note 22.
428
ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., supra note 427.
429
John, supra note 22. Slightly more than one-third of museums offer free admission,
or suggested admission fees. Id.; cf. Museum Facts, supra note 51.
423
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sider the costs of running a private operating foundation, and the
financial ramifications of any new policy changes for the private
museum sector. Increases in the number of visitors and hours of
operation affect “security, insurance, and museum staffing
costs[,] . . . [which] are not usually covered by increased attendance
and admission charges.”430 Smaller organizations with less funding
may not be able to survive if free admission was mandatory for private museums. This evinces the need for continued tax subsidies to
help arts institutions better sustain themselves, especially when
private museums help to alleviate government spending within the
arts sector.431
Despite Senator Hatch’s misgivings about appointment-only
and advanced reservation systems, this is standard practice for museums.432 Reservations are common among more established public
museums.433 The National Museum of African-American History
and Culture (“NMAAHC”) in Washington, D.C., has quickly ascended in the ranks to become one of the most popular “superstar
museums” in the country.434 The NMAAHC has welcomed over
750,000 visitors since opening in September 2016—far more than
originally anticipated.435 The NMAAHC offers free admission, but
requires visitors to reserve timed entry passes.436 Passes are fully
booked several months in advance, though the museum allows a
limited number of same-day visits.437 Private museums should also
430

THOMPSON, supra note 61, at 224.
For discussion on the economic decline in government spending in the nonprofit
museum sector, see supra Section I.B.
432
See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch to John Koskinen, supra note 12.
433
Id.; see also supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text.
434
See Heather Long, New African-American Museum ‘Sold Out’ Through March 2017,
CNN (Oct. 24, 2016, 9:52 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/21/news/economy/
museum-of-african-america-history-and-culture-passes [https://perma.cc/YGM7-7Z64].
435
More Options for Visiting the National Museum of African American History and Culture
Starting Jan. 4, SMITHSONIAN: NEWSDESK (Jan. 4, 2017), http://newsdesk.si.edu/
releases/more-options-visiting-national-museum-african-american-history-and-culturestarting-jan-4 [https://perma.cc/LBS3-PMN7] [hereinafter More Options for Visiting].
“The museum did conduct a study prior to the opening, and accordingly expected 7,500
visitors daily. Instead, 30,000 people have tried to get in some days. (The museum can
admit about 8,000).” Long, supra note 434.
436
More Options for Visiting, supra note 435.
437
Long, supra note 434. As of October 2016, passes were sold out through March 2017.
Id.
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accommodate same-day appointments to allow for more spontaneous visits, but should not be required to provide all same-day visitors admission when they are in high demand.438 Similar to the
NMAAHC, the Broad Museum in Los Angeles, California, has
been so popular since opening its doors in September 2015 that
wait times for same-day admission range from ten to forty-five minutes on weekdays, and from sixty to ninety minutes on weekends.439 The museum recently changed its reservation system to
make it easier for visitors to book free tickets online.440 Glenstone
requires scheduled visits, but unlike other institutions, appointments may be scheduled on the same day and are free.441 Once
Glenstone completes its expansion project in 2018, it will continue
the reservation system “on its website to make sure that everyone
enjoys an unhurried and less crowded experience.”442 While these
in-demand museums may serve as a model, private museums
should aim to create admission policies that cater best to their financial and institutional needs.
Last, the availability of online catalogues of a private museum’s
art collection is a positive factor that weighs in favor of exemption,
but should only be examined in light of the museum’s available resources. An increasing number of museums are digitizing their
holdings, but this is a lofty and expensive undertaking to implement. A museum’s website is a good measure of online activity
(not the outcome), provides beneficial resources, and can maximize
public engagement.443

438

See generally Jessica Gelt, Adapting to Demand, Broad Museum Changes Its Ticket
Reservation System, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016, 3:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
entertainment/arts/culture/la-et-cm-broad-museum-ticket-reservations-20160426-story.
html [https://perma.cc/DPE7-NZ87]. After appointments started filling up three to four
months in advance, the Broad limited visitors’ ability to book reservations up to one
month in advance. Id.; see also note 61 and accompanying text.
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Gelt, supra note 438.
440
Id.
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Admission to Glenstone Is Always Free, GLENSTONE, http://www.glenstone.org/
admission-glenstone-always-free [https://perma.cc/86DL-FW3P] (last visited Apr. 13,
2017).
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Halperin, supra note 44.
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CONCLUSION
More wealthy art collectors are founding private museums than
ever before. Although tax breaks for high-income individuals have
recently come under fire due to concern over private benefits, this
does not justify doing away with charitable deductions for private
art museums altogether. By nature, tax incentives confer some sort
of benefit on the founder, and should not disqualify an organization
unless the private interests at stake significantly outweigh the public benefit. However, a museum’s policies and programmatic efforts should ensure that the organization safeguards the public interest, and provides a beneficial service to society. The Code
should preserve these institutions’ tax-exempt status where appropriate, and should not enact overly prescriptive regulations that
would hinder the private museum sector’s ability to grow. Whether
these private operating foundations satisfy the public benefit requirement under section 501(c)(3) should continue to be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis. This analysis considers whether the museum’s activities fulfill its tax-exempt charitable purpose, in light of
the organization’s available resources and funding. In all, it is better to tolerate some private benefit during the donor-founder’s lifetime, so long as it is not egregious. The Code should continue to
encourage wealthy donors to create their own private operating
foundations: These private art institutions provide invaluable public benefits, promote growth in the nonprofit museum sector, and
safeguard priceless artworks for the benefit of future generations.
By allowing donor-founders to carry out their unique vision, private
museums provide greater autonomy for these institutions to cultivate more avant-gardes collections, and can lead to innovative and
unexpected results.

